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I. INTRODUCTION 
In Hodes & Nauser, MDs, P.A. v. Schmidt,1 the Kansas Supreme Court 
held that section 1 of the Kansas Constitution’s Bill of Rights protects a 
woman’s fundamental right “to make her own decisions regarding her 
body, health, family formation, and family life—decisions that can include 
whether to continue a pregnancy.”2  For the most part, reactions to this 
long-awaited and controversial decision fell along predictable lines, with 
pro-choice advocates hailing the decision as an important advancement for 
women’s reproductive freedoms, and right to life advocates condemning 
the decision and vowing to reverse it by state constitutional amendment.3  
In this Article, I will leave those important but intractable debates to one 
side and focus on a more practical question: What are the implications of 
Hodes & Nauser for the interpretation and application of constitutional 
rights in Kansas? 
The central premise of this Article is that Hodes & Nauser decouples 
Kansas individual rights doctrine from the United States Supreme Court’s 
constitutional rights jurisprudence, with significant implications not only 
for abortion rights but also for many other constitutional rights.4  When 
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 1. 440 P.3d 461, 466 (Kan. 2019) (upholding a trial court order granting a preliminary injunction 
to prevent enforcement of the Kansas Unborn Child Protection from Dismemberment Abortion Act, 
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-6741 to 66-6749 (West 2018), which prohibits the dilation and evacuation 
abortion procedure). 
 2. Id. 
 3. See, e.g., Celia LLopis-Jepsen, Kansas Lawmakers Want to Block the Right to Abortion by 
Changing the State Constitution, KCUR 89.3 (Jan. 22, 2020), https://www.kcur.org/post/kansas 
-lawmakers-want-block-right-abortion-changing-state-constitution#stream/0 [https://perma.cc/5T32 
-ZJQP]; Jonathan Shorman, Kansas Moving Closer to 2020 Showdown Over Abortion After Supreme 
Court Decision, WICHITA EAGLE (Oct. 1, 2019, 6:14 PM), https://www-1.kansas.com/news/politics 
-government/article235683267.html# [https://perma.cc/LW8L-4XKE].   
 4. Because this Article analyzes the implications of the Hodes & Nauser decision, it focuses on 
the per curiam opinion of the court and will not attempt to summarize the differing views expressed 
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interpreting their own constitution’s individual rights protections, state 
supreme courts are not directly bound by United States Supreme Court 
decisions respecting similar rights under the United States Constitution.  
Federal constitutional rights establish a minimum set of rights that state 
governments must respect, even when their respective state constitutions 
would not protect those rights.5  Although states often align their own 
constitutional jurisprudence with federal precedents, they are free to 
provide greater protection for individual rights under their own 
constitutions than the federal minimum. 
The Kansas Supreme Court might have reached the same result in 
Hodes & Nauser by aligning the Kansas Bill of Rights’ protections with 
the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,6 under which the right to an abortion 
is a “liberty interest” and regulations impinging on that liberty interest are 
evaluated under the “undue burden” test.7  Instead, the Kansas Supreme 
Court held that the decision to have an abortion is a component of a 
woman’s inalienable natural right of personal autonomy protected by 
section 1, and that strict scrutiny is the proper test for analyzing laws that 
burden abortion rights.8  Under strict scrutiny, such laws must serve a 
“compelling governmental interest” and be “narrowly tailored” to further 
that interest.9 
This analysis represents a repudiation not only of Casey, but also of 
the broader doctrinal approach that Casey epitomizes.  As will be 
developed more fully below, the United States Supreme Court’s 
precedents in the Warren and Burger Courts crystalized into a 
 
in the concurring and dissenting opinions.  See Hodes & Nauser, 440 P.3d at 504–17 (Biles, J., 
concurring) (agreeing with the majority that section 1 protects a fundamental right to determine 
whether to continue a pregnancy but arguing in favor of the “evidence-based analytical model” of 
Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016)); id. at 517–57 (Stegall, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that section 1 should be read as a general constraint on the police power enforced using the 
rational basis test rather than a mechanism for enhanced protection of a limited set of fundamental 
rights). 
 5. Accordingly, when parties assert both state and federal rights, state courts may elect to resolve 
them solely on the basis of federal law so as to avoid elaborating on the state constitution 
unnecessarily.  Thus, for example, in Oklahoma Coalition for Reproductive Justice v. Cline, the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court referenced Hodes & Nauser but found it unnecessary to determine whether 
the Oklahoma Constitution protected abortion rights because the law was invalid under federal 
precedents that the court was bound to apply.  441 P.3d 1145, 1151 (Okla. 2019).  The Kansas Supreme 
Court did not have that option in Hodes & Nauser because the plaintiffs explicitly declined to rely on 
federal law.  440 P.3d at 466, 471. 
 6. 505 U.S. 833, 915–17 (1992). 
 7. That was the approach taken by the district court and court of appeals plurality in Hodes & 
Nauser.  See 440 P.3d at 499–500 (discussing the trial court’s reasoning); id. at 504–17 (Biles, J., 
concurring) (arguing in favor of the approach used in Whole Woman’s Health). 
 8. See infra Section II.B (discussing the Kansas Supreme Court’s analysis in Hodes & Nauser).  
 9. See infra notes 45–46 and accompanying text (discussing the levels of ends-means scrutiny). 
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comprehensive fundamental rights framework based upon a broad 
conceptual understanding of rights and strict scrutiny of laws burdening 
rights the Court deemed fundamental.10  The Rehnquist and Roberts 
Courts, however, have taken a right-specific approach that demands 
independent constitutional justification for specific rights claims, applying 
this approach to reject the expansion of existing rights and narrow or 
weaken many rights previously recognized as fundamental.11  Casey is a 
particularly relevant example of this approach.12 
Thus, Hodes & Nauser rejected not only Casey, but also the right-
specific approach of the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts.  Instead, the 
Kansas Supreme Court linked Kansas constitutional doctrine to the 
fundamental rights approach employed by the Warren and Burger Courts.  
The analysis in Hodes & Nauser therefore has important implications not 
only for abortion rights in Kansas but also for the broader jurisprudence of 
constitutional rights under the Kansas Bill of Rights.13  This Article 
develops and explores this thesis in two steps.  Part II examines Hodes & 
Nauser in context, contrasting federal constitutional rights jurisprudence 
with the Kansas Supreme Court’s section 1 analysis.  Part III then 
considers the implications of Hodes & Nauser’s analysis for three types of 
rights: abortion rights, other rights under section 1, and other provisions 
of the Kansas Constitution’s Bill of Rights.  In conclusion, Part IV 
summarizes these implications and offers some additional observations. 
II. HODES & NAUSER IN CONTEXT 
To lay the foundations for the discussion of its implications, this Part 
focuses on understanding the Hodes & Nauser decision in context.  The 
discussion begins with a brief primer on constitutional rights doctrine in 
relation to the right of abortion so as to frame the critical questions 
confronting the Kansas Supreme Court in Hodes & Nauser.  It then 
highlights two key aspects of the Hodes & Nauser decision: (1) the court’s 
approach to the recognition of constitutional rights as applied to abortion 
rights; and (2) the application of strict scrutiny to invalidate the law in 
 
 10. See infra Section II.A.1.  It was this framework that produced Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 
(1973). 
 11. See infra Section II.A.2 (discussing the modern Court’s right-specific approach). 
 12. See 505 U.S. at 853–54 (purporting to preserve the “central holding” of Roe).  For further 
discussion of Casey, see infra notes 77–80 and accompanying text. 
 13. See, e.g., Hilburn v. Enerpipe, Ltd., 442 P.3d 509, 513 (Kan. 2019) (relying on Hodes & 
Nauser to invalidate a statutory damages cap as a violation of the right to a jury under section 5 of the 
Kansas Bill of Rights).  Although Hilburn is the only judicial decision to do so at the time of this 
writing, many litigants have relied on Hodes & Nauser to argue for enhanced protection for a variety 
of other rights.  See infra Part III. 
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question. 
A. A Brief Primer on Constitutional Rights Doctrine 
For well over a century, the United States Supreme Court has applied 
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution to protect 
certain constitutional rights against infringement by state governments.  
The initial focus of the Court’s precedents was the protection of property 
rights and freedom of contract, but those precedents laid the foundation 
for the protection of other rights, including the so-called right of privacy.  
By the 1960s and 1970s, the resulting doctrine had crystalized into what 
this Article will refer to as the “fundamental rights” approach to individual 
rights that was favored by the “liberal” Warren and Burger Courts.14  With 
the appointment of more “conservative” Justices, the fundamental rights 
approach eroded and the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts’ jurisprudence 
moved toward what this Article will refer to as a “right-specific” approach.  
Both of these developments were crucial to the evolution of abortion rights 
doctrine before Hodes & Nauser. 
1. The Fundamental Rights Approach 
The fundamental rights approach crystalized during the 1960s and 
1970s as the culmination of a series of interrelated developments that had 
their roots in the so-called Lochner era (from the 1890s through the 
1930s).15  Under the fundamental rights approach, most laws were subject 
to the deferential rational basis test, and were upheld if they were rationally 
related to any legitimate governmental purpose.16  Government action that 
burdened fundamental rights, however, triggered strict scrutiny, and could 
be upheld only if it was necessary to further a compelling governmental 
interest.17  Rights were deemed fundamental if they were deeply rooted in 
our traditions, implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, or preservative of 
 
 14. For convenience, this Article uses the terms “liberal” and “conservative” in accordance with 
their conventional current usage, while recognizing that both terms are poorly defined, highly 
malleable, and frequently changing.  
 15. See generally David E. Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism, Revised: Lochner and the 
Origins of Fundamental Rights Constitutionalism, 92 GEO. L.J. 1 (2003). 
 16. See, e.g., Feguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 733 (1963) (applying the rational basis test to 
uphold statute requiring a law license to engage in practice of debt adjustment); Williamson v. Lee 
Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955) (applying the rational basis test to uphold statute 
requiring prescription from optometrist or ophthalmologist to duplicate or replace eyeglass lenses).  
 17. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (concluding that a woman’s decision to terminate 
a pregnancy is within the fundamental right of privacy and applying strict scrutiny to invalidate law 
criminalizing abortion).   
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other rights.18  In addition, once a fundamental right was recognized, the 
Court could expand it conceptually, bringing new interests under the 
penumbra of that right.19 
In the decades following the Civil War, the Supreme Court was 
reluctant to read the Fourteenth Amendment broadly as a source of 
constitutional rights that limited the states.  Critically, the Court’s decision 
in the Slaughter-House Cases20 all but eliminated the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as a source of 
constitutional rights.21  During the Lochner era, however, the Court began 
to use the Fourteenth Amendment as a source of rights protections against 
state action.  In light of the Slaughterhouse Cases, the Court could not rely 
on the Privileges and Immunities Clause, so it relied on the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment instead.22 
Under the doctrine of substantive due process, individual liberties 
could only be regulated by the state pursuant to valid exercises of the 
police power.  As reflected in Lochner itself,23 the primary focus of 
substantive due process was the protection of contract and property rights 
and the Court often scrutinized carefully the alleged police-power 
justifications for state laws burdening those rights.  This approach was part 
of a broader pattern of decisions and doctrines through which the Court 
invalidated federal and state regulation of business activity.24  This aspect 
 
 18. See, e.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952) (“Due process of law is a 
summarized constitutional guarantee of respect for those personal immunities which, as Mr. Justice 
Cardozo twice wrote for the Court, are ‘so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to 
be ranked as fundamental’, or are ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’” (first quoting Snyder v. 
Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934); and then quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 
(1937))). 
 19. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs., Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 684–85 (1977) (“This right of 
personal privacy includes the interest in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions.  
While the outer limits of this aspect of privacy have not been marked by the Court, it is clear that 
among the decisions that an individual may make without unjustified government interference are 
personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child 
rearing and education.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). 
 20. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). 
 21. Specifically, the Court held that the Clause protected only the rights of United States 
citizenship, which by definition did not include the rights of state citizenship, which are protected by 
the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV.  Id. at 72–74.  Accordingly, any right that was 
attributable to state citizenship was not a right of national citizenship.  See id.  Since the courts 
previously read those rights broadly, there were few, if any, rights attributable to national citizenship.  
See id. at 75–80. 
 22. See, e.g., Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897) (relying on the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment to invalidate a state law that interfered with liberty of contract). 
 23. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64–65 (1905) (invalidating a law that limited the hours 
of bakery workers as an improper infringement on liberty of contract because limiting the hours of 
bakery workers was not necessary to protect the public health or the health of bakery workers).  
 24. See Richard E. Levy, Escaping Lochner’s Shadow: Toward A Coherent Jurisprudence of 
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of the Court’s Lochner-era jurisprudence was later repudiated, and the case 
came to symbolize improper judicial activism.25 
The roots of modern privacy doctrine also lie in the Lochner era.  Most 
directly, in Meyer v. Nebraska26 and Pierce v. Society of Sisters,27 the 
Court held that due process protects the rights of parents to the custody 
and care of their children.  In Meyer, the Court declared broadly: 
[The “liberty” protected by due process] denotes not merely freedom 
from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to 
engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful 
knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship 
God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to 
enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the 
orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.28 
Equally important, the Court began during the Lochner era to 
incorporate provisions of the Bill of Rights via the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment so as to make them applicable to the states.29  
Perhaps predictably, considering the Court’s focus on contract and 
property rights, the Takings Clause was the first Bill of Rights provision 
made applicable to the states via the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.30  The Court, however, also applied some First Amendment 
protections against the states during the Lochner era.31  The incorporation 
doctrine further solidified the role of the Due Process Clause as a source 
of fundamental rights. 
 
Economic Rights, 73 N.C. L. REV. 329, 342–44 (1995) [hereinafter Levy, Escaping Lochner’s 
Shadow] (“During the Lochner era, of course, the Court stood in opposition to an ever-increasing tide 
of economic and social legislation.  Relying on substantive economic due process, as well as other 
substantive and structural doctrines to invalidate regulatory efforts at the state and federal levels, the 
Court effectively constitutionalized the laissez-faire jurisprudence of the common law.” (footnotes 
omitted)). 
 25. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963) (“The doctrine that prevailed in 
Lochner . . . and like cases—that due process authorizes courts to hold laws unconstitutional when 
they believe the legislature has acted unwisely—has long since been discarded.  We have returned to 
the original constitutional proposition that courts do not substitute their social and economic beliefs 
for the judgment of legislative bodies, who are elected to pass laws.”).  
 26. 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
 27. 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
 28. 262 U.S. at 399. 
 29. See generally McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 759–66 (2010) (providing a 
detailed account of the history and evolution of the incorporation doctrine). 
 30. Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 258 (1897) (incorporating 
Fifth Amendment prohibition on taking of private property for public use without just compensation). 
 31. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (freedom of the press); Stromberg v. California, 
283 U.S. 359, 376 (1931) (freedom of speech); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (same); see 
also Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (applying the Sixth Amendment right to counsel against 
the states). 
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In 1937, the Court abruptly abandoned its antiregulatory 
jurisprudence, overruling and repudiating many of its Lochner era 
precedents.32  Nonetheless, the prior doctrine continued to influence the 
Court’s emerging fundamental rights jurisprudence.  Thus, although the 
Court emphasized deference to legislative judgements concerning the 
police powers, it continued to engage in substantive review of state and 
federal laws.  Critically, even as it announced an extraordinarily 
deferential form of rational basis review for regulations burdening 
property and contract rights in United States v. Carolene Products Co.,33 
the Court hinted in a famous footnote that it would employ more 
aggressive forms of review for some types of regulations.34  This footnote 
also preserved Meyer and Pierce as viable precedents.35 
Another important doctrinal development was the use of the Equal 
Protection Clause to protect fundamental rights, which likely reflected the 
Court’s reluctance to rely on due process for protection of nontextual 
rights in the aftermath of the Lochner era.  The use of equal protection to 
justify strict scrutiny of state laws burdening fundamental rights originated 
in Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, which invalidated a state law 
providing for compulsory sterilization of persons convicted three times for 
specified criminal offenses.36  The Court emphasized that the law involved 
“one of the basic civil rights of man” and that “[m]arriage and procreation 
are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race.”37  
Accordingly, the Court explained, “strict scrutiny of the classification 
which a State makes in a sterilization law is essential, lest unwittingly, or 
 
 32. See Levy, Escaping Lochner’s Shadow, supra note 24, at 344–45 (“The Lochner era ended 
abruptly in 1937 with the famous ‘switch in time that saved nine,’ which marked the beginning of an 
era of liberal constitutional jurisprudence.  Since that time, the Court has routinely rejected challenges 
to economic regulation regardless of the substantive or structural provisions invoked to protect 
economic rights, by applying the deferential rational basis test.  Under this test, the government need 
only show that a measure is reasonably related to some conceivable legitimate purpose.” (footnotes 
omitted)). 
 33. 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938) (“[T]he existence of facts supporting the legislative judgment is to 
be presumed, for regulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions is not to be 
pronounced unconstitutional unless in the light of the facts made known or generally assumed it is of 
such a character as to preclude the assumption that it rests upon some rational basis within the 
knowledge and experience of the legislators.”). 
 34. Id. at 152 n.4. 
 35. See id. (“Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the review of statutes 
directed at particular religious, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, or national, Meyer v. Nebraska, or racial 
minorities; whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which 
tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to 
protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.” 
(citations omitted)).  In so doing, the Court characterized these decisions as discrimination cases, rather 
than fundamental rights cases.  
 36. 316 U.S. 535, 536 (1942). 
 37. Id. at 541. 
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otherwise invidious discriminations are made against groups or types of 
individuals in violation of the constitutional guaranty of just and equal 
laws.”38  After Skinner, fundamental rights could receive enhanced 
protection under both the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. 
A final doctrinal development in the post-Lochner period was the 
expanding use of the incorporation doctrine to hold that provisions of the 
Bill of Rights applied to the states.  The Court endorsed this approach in 
Carolene Products, which observed that “[t]here may be narrower scope 
for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation 
appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, 
such as those of the first ten Amendments, which are deemed equally 
specific when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth.”39  In a series of 
decisions that produced a famous debate over the proper relationship 
between the Bill of Rights, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the states, the 
Court eventually settled on an approach known as “selective 
incorporation.”40  Under this approach, a provision of the Bill of Rights 
would be incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause and apply to the states if it was “so rooted in the traditions and 
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental”41 or “implicit in 
the concept of ordered liberty.”42 
Building on these developments, during the 1960s and 1970s, the 
Court’s constitutional rights jurisprudence crystalized into a single 
overarching framework that merged due process and equal protection 
analysis.  Under this approach, government action would be reviewed 
under one of three levels of ends-means scrutiny.  The baseline level of 
scrutiny, the rational basis test, would apply unless there was a reason to 
apply a heightened form of scrutiny.43  Under the rational basis test, 
government action is presumptively valid and the burden is on the party 
 
 38. Id.  
 39. 304 U.S. at 152 n.4 (emphasis added). 
 40. See Jerold H. Israel, Selective Incorporation: Revisited, 71 GEO. L.J. 253, 253 (1982).  For a 
recent and somewhat controversial application of the incorporation doctrine, see Ramos v. Louisiana, 
140 S. Ct. 1390 (2020) (concluding that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel as incorporated and 
applied against the states requires unanimous verdicts to convict defendants of major offenses and 
overruling contrary precedent that applied different rules in federal and state prosecutions). 
 41. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934). 
 42. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).  This test could be stated in various ways, 
some of which were broader than others, but in all its forms it retained the same two basic 
components—one that focused on the historical recognition of a right and the other focused on its 
centrality to the concept of liberty. 
 43. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 733 (1963) (applying the rational basis test to 
uphold a statute requiring a law license to engage in business of debt adjustment); Williamson v. Lee 
Optical Co. of Okla. Inc., 348 US 483, 491 (1955) (applying the rational basis test to uphold a statute 
prohibiting opticians from fitting or duplicating lenses without a prescription from an ophthalmologist 
or optometrist).  
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challenging the law to show that the law is not rationally related to any 
legitimate end.44  When laws burdened fundamental rights, however, strict 
scrutiny would apply under either due process or equal protection.45  To 
survive strict scrutiny, the burden is on the state to show that its action is 
necessary and/or narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental 
interest.46  The third level of scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, required that 
government action must serve an important governmental interest and be 
substantially related to that interest.47 
Under the Court’s fundamental rights jurisprudence, the critical 
question in most cases was whether an asserted right was fundamental in 
character so as to trigger strict scrutiny.  Building on Meyer, Pierce, and 
Skinner, the Court in Griswold v. Connecticut recognized a fundamental 
 
 44. In its typically deferential form, the burden was on the party challenging the rule to show that 
the law did not serve any plausible legitimate purpose.  Legitimate purposes were broadly conceived 
and could include post hoc rationalizations.  So long as the government could reasonably believe that 
the law would further those purposes, it did not matter whether there might be less restrictive or 
burdensome means, or whether the law was substantially over or under inclusive.  For an example of 
this sort of extreme deference, see FCC v. Beach Comms., Inc., 508 U.S. 307 (1993) (upholding statute 
requiring local franchise for satellite master antenna and television facilities but exempting systems 
serving buildings under common ownership). 
 45. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (applying strict scrutiny to a invalidate 
law that prevented fathers who were behind in child support obligations from getting married); Moore 
v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (applying strict scrutiny to a zoning ordinance that 
prevented extended family from living together in single family neighborhood).  Strict scrutiny would 
apply in other contexts as well, including review of government action that employed racial 
classifications, see, e.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984) (applying strict scrutiny to invalidate 
state court judgment removing child from mother’s custody because she married a person of a different 
race), and content-based regulations of speech, see, e.g., Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the 
N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105 (1991) (applying strict scrutiny to a state “Son of Sam” 
law requiring convicted criminals’ income from works describing their crimes to be deposited in an 
escrow account for the benefit of their victims and other creditors).  The Court’s suspect classification 
and First Amendment jurisprudence are definitely part of the larger trends discussed in this Article, 
but they are not directly relevant to the Hodes & Nauser decision and so will not be explored further 
here. 
 46. Under strict scrutiny, the government has to satisfy a very heavy burden in order to justify a 
law.  See generally cases cited supra note 45.  There must be convincing evidence to support the 
governmental interest asserted in support of the laws.  More significantly, perhaps, government action 
would not be necessary or narrowly tailored to those purposes if there were less restrictive or 
burdensome alternatives or if the action was over or under inclusive.  Although the Court tended to 
use the term “necessary” when dealing with fundamental rights and “narrowly tailored” when dealing 
with suspect classifications, in practice both terms incorporated less restrictive alternative and 
over/under inclusiveness analysis. 
 47. Under equal protection doctrine, intermediate scrutiny applies to sex and gender-based 
classifications.  See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (invalidating an Oklahoma law 
establishing differential drinking age for males and females).  Intermediate scrutiny also applies to 
classifications affecting nonmarital children.  See, e.g., Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456 (1988) 
(invalidating a statute requiring nonmarital children to prove paternity before turning six in order to 
seek child support).  Under First Amendment doctrine, intermediate scrutiny applies to content neutral 
laws regulating speech.  See, e.g., Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984) 
(applying intermediate scrutiny to uphold a ban on camping in public park as applied to a 
demonstration using sleeping in a park as a means of protest against homelessness). 
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right of privacy associated with marriage, procreation, and the family, 
invalidating a law prohibiting the use of contraception by married 
couples.48  Griswold relied on the notion that this right was within the 
penumbras of specific provisions of the Bill of Rights,49 perhaps in an 
effort to link the right to the incorporation doctrine and Carolene Products.  
In subsequent cases, however, the Court abandoned that approach and 
simply treated privacy as a nontextual fundamental right. 
These subsequent cases took the right of privacy as a given, and the 
Court addressed particular rights claims by asking whether the claim was 
sufficiently related to the right so as to fall within its scope.50  This 
approach allowed the Court to expand the right of privacy conceptually by 
associating particular claims to the underlying concept of privacy rather 
than by engaging in an independent assessment of whether a particular 
right was fundamental.  It was this kind of analysis that eventually 
produced Roe v. Wade, in which the Court concluded that a woman’s right 
to control her pregnancy was within the scope of the right of privacy.51  
During this same period, however, the Court also recognized other, 
unrelated rights as fundamental and subject to strict scrutiny, including the 
right to vote52 and the right to travel,53 often relying on the Equal 
Protection Clause. 
Although the cases established several categories of fundamental 
rights, most prominently the right of privacy, they did not establish a clear 
framework for determining whether a right was fundamental.  Some of the 
due process cases connected the recognition of nontextual fundamental 
rights with the incorporation doctrine.54  The equal protection cases often 
referenced the ways in which particular rights, such as the right to vote, 
 
 48. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 49. See id. at 484–86. 
 50. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 684–85 (1977) (describing the right of 
privacy as a “cluster of constitutionally protected choices”). 
 51. 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (“This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as the 
District Court determined, in the Ninth Amendment’s reservation of rights to the people, is broad 
enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.”). 
 52. See Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667 (1966) (applying strict scrutiny under 
the Equal Protection Clause to invalidate a poll tax as a violation of fundamental right to vote); 
Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 18 (1964) (applying strict scrutiny to invalidate use of legislative 
districts of unequal population as a violation of the fundamental right to vote). 
 53. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 674 (1969) (applying strict scrutiny to invalidate a state 
law requiring people to live in the state for one year before they would be eligible for welfare benefits 
because this “durational residence requirement” burdened the fundamental right to travel in violation 
of the Equal Protection Clause).  
 54. This connection was explicit in Griswold v. Connecticut, in which the Court grounded the 
right to privacy in the penumbras of incorporated bill of rights provisions, such as the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments.  See 381 U.S. 479, 482–85 (1965). 
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were preservative of other rights.55  In many other cases, as in Roe, the 
Court expanded the scope of previously recognized rights conceptually.56  
In the end, however, the decisions largely depended upon the judgment of 
the Court that a particular right was important enough to be deemed 
fundamental. 
2. The Right-Specific Approach 
Even as the fundamental rights approach reached its peak, a series of 
conservative appointments sowed the seeds of its eventual erosion.57  As 
described below, starting in the 1980s and with increasing momentum in 
the decades that followed, the Supreme Court refashioned its 
constitutional rights jurisprudence—one right at a time.  This right-
specific approach rejected the conceptual expansion of fundamental rights 
and demanded an independent constitutional pedigree for each asserted 
right.  Under this approach, the Court not only resisted the expansion of 
fundamental rights doctrine, but also reexamined the foundations of 
previously determined rights, often restating the doctrine in ways that 
limited or reduced the protection for those rights. 
Insofar as the right-specific approach isolates each claimed right on its 
own constitutional foundation, the Court also moved away from the 
comprehensive application of the three levels of ends-means scrutiny, 
adopting distinctive rules and tests for each kind of recognized right.  
Although the Court has not completely repudiated the fundamental rights 
approach and occasionally relies on some of its elements, the right-specific 
approach has fundamentally reshaped the landscape of rights, including 
abortion rights. 
The core premise of the right-specific approach is that each rights 
 
 55. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964) (“Especially since the right to exercise 
the franchise in a free and unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil and political rights, 
any alleged infringement of the right of citizens to vote must be carefully and meticulously 
scrutinized.”). 
 56. See supra note 51. 
 57. President Nixon appointed Justice Rehnquist in 1972, who became Chief Justice in 1986 on 
the retirement of Chief Justice Burger.  President Reagan appointed Justice O’Connor in 1981 and 
Justice Scalia in 1986.  President George H.W. Bush appointed Justice Kennedy in 1988, Justice 
Souter in 1990, and Justice Thomas in 1991.  Although Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, who 
formed the plurality in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 
(1992), came to be regarded as moderates, their appointments moved the Court in a more conservative 
direction.  More recently, President George W. Bush appointed Chief Justice Roberts in 2005 and 
Justice Alito in 2006, and President Trump appointed Justice Gorsuch in 2017 and Justice Kavanaugh 
in 2018.  Although Presidents Clinton and Obama appointed some liberal Justices, the current Court 
has a majority of five staunchly conservative justices.  
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claim must rest on its own right-specific constitutional foundation.58  In 
keeping with this approach, the Court would define a claimed right 
narrowly and resist the extension of previously recognized rights, such as 
the right of privacy, by analogy.  If a particular claim is not within the 
scope of previously recognized rights, then its proponents must identify an 
independent constitutional basis for protecting the right.  Although the Due 
Process Clause provided a constitutional foundation for the protection of 
substantive liberties, under the right-specific approach it applied only if 
the particular rights claim is deeply rooted in our traditions and collective 
conscience or implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.59 
The Court deployed this type of analysis in Bowers v. Hardwick, 
which declined to expand the right of privacy so as to recognize a right of 
consensual intimacy between same-sex couples in the privacy of their 
home.60  The Court began by characterizing the issue in the case as 
“whether the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right upon 
homosexuals to engage in sodomy and hence invalidates the laws of the 
many States that still make such conduct illegal and have done so for a 
very long time.”61  The Court then concluded that “none of the rights 
announced in [the Court’s privacy] cases bears any resemblance to the 
claimed constitutional right of homosexuals to engage in acts of sodomy” 
and that “[n]o connection between family, marriage, or procreation on the 
one hand and homosexual activity on the other has been demonstrated.”62  
Finally, the Court had no difficulty concluding that, given the history of 
criminal proscriptions against sodomy, “to claim that a right to engage in 
such conduct is ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition’ or 
‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty’ is, at best, facetious.”63 
Chief Justice Rehnquist purported to formalize this approach in 
Washington v. Glucksberg, which upheld state laws criminalizing 
physician-assisted suicide.64  His opinion for the Court began with the 
following statement of the law: 
 Our established method of substantive-due-process analysis has two 
 
 58. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (declining to recognize the right to 
physician assisted suicide).  
 59. In addition, the Court often relied on an historical analysis when deciding whether a right was 
implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, reasoning that the lack of historical protections for a right 
was evidence that the right was not essential to ordered liberty.  This sort of analysis made it especially 
difficult to successfully assert new rights.  
 60. 478 U.S. 186, 195–96 (1986). 
 61. Id. at 190. 
 62. Id. at 190–91. 
 63. Id. at 194. 
 64. 521 U.S. 702, 792 (1997). 
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primary features: First, we have regularly observed that the Due Process 
Clause specially protects those fundamental rights and liberties which 
are, objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition, and 
implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that “neither liberty nor 
justice would exist if they were sacrificed.  Second, we have required in 
substantive-due-process cases a careful description of the asserted 
fundamental liberty interest.65 
In keeping with this approach, the Court rejected the characterization of 
the right at issue as the “right to die,” describing it instead as “a right to 
commit suicide which itself includes a right to assistance in doing so.”66 
It is worth emphasizing that the narrow definition of the right at issue 
is critical to the rejection of rights under this analysis.  For example, the 
right to same-sex sodomy is neither connected to privacy protections nor 
independently recognizable under the test for fundamental rights, but the 
right to intimacy between consenting adults in the privacy of the home 
might be.67  Likewise, the right to die is much more likely to be implicit in 
the concept of ordered liberty than the right to physician-assisted suicide.68 
The Bowers/Glucksberg doctrine did not completely prevent the 
expansion of the right to privacy.  In Cruzan v. Director, Missouri 
Department of Health, the Court concluded that the right to refuse 
unwanted medical treatment, as a component of the right of bodily 
integrity, met the deeply rooted and implicit in ordered liberty test for 
substantive due process.69  More fundamentally, in some other cases the 
Court continued to define the right at issue broadly and explicitly rejected 
the narrow conception of individual rights claims.  Most directly, in 
Lawrence v. Texas,70 the Court overruled Bowers, explicitly criticizing the 
prior decision’s characterization of the right.71  The Court used the same 
sort of reasoning to recognize the right of same-sex couples to marry in 
 
 65. Id. at 720–21 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  
 66. Id. at 723. 
 67. Compare Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190–91 (explaining that there is no fundamental right to same-
sex sodomy), with Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484–86 (1965) (holding that there is a right 
to privacy in intimate decisions in the marital bedroom).   
 68. Compare Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (rejecting the right to physician assisted suicide), with 
Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (recognizing the right to refuse medical 
treatment). 
 69. 497 U.S. 261, 269–70, 281–82 (1990). 
 70. 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (concluding that due process protects the right of adult same-sex 
couples to consensual sexual intimacy in the privacy of the home). 
 71. See id. at 567 (concluding that the Bowers Court’s characterization of the right at issue 
“discloses the Court’s own failure to appreciate the extent of the liberty at stake” and that “[t]o say 
that the issue in Bowers was simply the right to engage in certain sexual conduct demeans the claim 
the individual put forward, just as it would demean a married couple were it to be said marriage is 
simply about the right to have sexual intercourse”). 
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Obergefell v. Hodges.72 
During this period, the Court also reexamined the foundations of some 
previously recognized fundamental rights.  Although the result of this 
reexamination seldom resulted in a complete reversal of prior cases, it 
often meant that the Court construed the right more narrowly or adopted a 
less protective test for the right.  These developments had particular 
significance for cases involving fundamental rights under the Equal 
Protection Clause.  In Saenz v. Roe,73 for example, the Court held that the 
right to travel arises under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship and 
Privileges and Immunities Clauses rather than the Equal Protection 
Clause, adopting a narrow per se rule against treating new residents less 
favorably than long-term residents rather than a broad application of strict 
scrutiny for laws that burden interstate movement.74  Similarly, in 
Crawford v. Marion County Election Board,75 the Court upheld a voter ID 
law, declining to apply strict scrutiny in the absence of proof that the law 
imposed a severe burden on the right to vote.76 
The right-specific approach led to fundamental changes in the Court’s 
abortion rights jurisprudence.  The plurality in Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey reaffirmed that the right of privacy 
encompassed abortion rights and the Roe v. Wade’s “core holding,”77 but 
it pointedly declined to characterize abortion rights as fundamental78 and 
replaced strict scrutiny with a weaker right-specific standard, the “undue 
 
 72. See 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015) (noting that prior cases did not narrowly define the right, 
such as the “right to interracial marriage” or the “right of inmates to marry,” but more broadly 
characterized the right as the “right to marry,” which the Court applied here).   
 73. 526 U.S. 489, 510 (1999) (invalidating a state law limiting welfare benefits for new residents). 
 74. See id. at 499–504 (re-examining foundations of the three components of the right to travel 
and concluding that the right of new residents to become citizens and receive equal treatment derives 
from the Citizenship and Privileges and Immunities Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment).  Although 
this analysis preserved the result of Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), it limits the scope of 
the right to travel in other contexts.  Saenz, 526 U.S. at 506–07.  
 75. 553 U.S. 181 (2008). 
 76. Id. at 202–04.  The plurality opinion adopted a sliding-scale test under which the level of 
scrutiny rises with the extent of the burden on the right to vote.  See id. at 190–91 (plurality opinion) 
(describing application of the “balancing approach” under which the Court must “weigh the asserted 
injury to the right to vote against the ‘precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the 
burden imposed by its rule’” (quoting Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 443 (1992))).  The concurring 
Justices rejected that test in favor of a two-tiered analysis under which the rational basis test applied 
unless the burden on the right to vote is severe, in which case strict scrutiny applies.  See id. at 204–
05 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“To evaluate a law respecting the right to vote . . . we use the approach set 
out in Burdick v. Takushi.  This calls for application of a deferential ‘important regulatory interests’ 
standard for nonsevere, nondiscriminatory restrictions, reserving strict scrutiny for laws that severely 
restrict the right to vote.” (citation omitted) (quoting Burdick, 504 U.S. 428, 433–34)). 
 77. 505 U.S. 833, 853 (1992). 
 78. See, e.g., id. (“It was this dimension of personal liberty that Roe sought to protect, and its 
holding invoked the reasoning and the tradition of the precedents we have discussed, granting 
protection to substantive liberties of the person.”). 
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burden” test.79  In the aftermath of Casey, a majority of the Court appeared 
to embrace the undue burden test, but subsequent decisions sent mixed 
signals regarding the test’s application.80  Most recently, Whole Woman’s 
Health v. Hellerstedt appeared to affirm a less deferential version of the 
undue burden test, but only seven Justices decided the case, as Justice 
Scalia had passed and Justice Kagan recused herself.81 
Since Whole Woman’s Health, Justice Scalia has been replaced by 
Justice Gorsuch82 and Justice Kennedy—who represented the crucial vote 
in Whole Woman’s Health and other important privacy rights cases—has 
been replaced by Justice Kavanaugh.83  It is widely assumed that both 
Justice Gorsuch and Justice Kavanaugh would vote to overturn Roe v. 
Wade, although Justices have been known to surprise on this issue in the 
past.84  In any event, the future of federal protection for abortion rights is 
in doubt. 
3. The Relationship Between Federal and State Constitutional Rights 
Federal and state constitutional rights interact in complex ways.  
Under the Supremacy Clause, state laws are invalid to the extent that they 
interfere with federal constitutional rights.85  Under the original 
Constitution, however, the Bill of Rights applied only to the national 
government,86 and only a few provisions in Article I, Section 10 protected 
 
 79. See id. at 874 (“Only where state regulation imposes an undue burden on a woman’s ability 
to make this decision does the power of the State reach into the heart of the liberty protected by the 
Due Process Clause.”); see also id. at 877 (“A finding of an undue burden is a shorthand for the 
conclusion that a state regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path 
of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.”). 
 80. Compare Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 922 (2000) (invalidating a Nebraska statute 
prohibiting “partial birth” abortions), with Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 132–33 (2007) 
(distinguishing Stenberg and upholding a federal statute limiting certain partial birth abortions).  For 
further discussion of these cases, see infra notes 145–51 and accompanying text. 
 81. 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016) (invalidating a Texas law requiring physicians performing abortions 
to have admitting privileges at nearby hospitals and requiring facilities to meet requirements for 
surgical centers). 
 82. Nina Totenberg, Senate Confirms Gorsuch to Supreme Court, NPR (Apr. 7, 2017, 5:00 AM), 
https://www.npr.org/2017/04/07/522902281/senate-confirms-gorsuch-to-supreme-court [https:// 
perma.cc/M8Q2-FFN8]. 
 83. Tessa Berenson, Inside Brett Kavanaugh’s First Term on the Supreme Court, TIME (June 28, 
2019), https://time.com/longform/brett-kavanaugh-supreme-court-first-term/ [https://perma.cc/9PMD 
-5QXJ]. 
 84. Indeed, the three Justices in the Casey plurality (Justices Kennedy, O’Connor, and Souter) 
were all appointed by Republican Presidents who sought to overturn Roe.   
 85. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 86. Barron v. City of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250 (1833) (holding the Bill of Rights did 
not apply to the states). 
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individual rights against states.87  This arrangement rested in part on the 
assumption that state constitutions would serve as the primary protectors 
of individual rights, but was also driven by the concerns of slave states that 
federal rights protections might be wielded against states to prohibit 
slavery.88 
In the aftermath of the Civil War, the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and 
Fifteenth Amendments established federal constitutional protections for 
certain individual rights against states.  The Supreme Court construed 
these protections narrowly in the Civil Rights Cases89 and the Slaughter-
House Cases,90 but the Court changed course during the Lochner era.91  By 
the end of the twentieth century, the Court had recognized a broad array 
of federal individual rights protections against the states. 
State courts are constitutionally obligated to apply these rights to their 
own governments.92  In this sense, federal constitutional rights represent a 
floor—the minimum level of constitutional protections for those rights.  
States must respect these rights even if their own constitutions offer no 
protection for similar rights.  Thus, for example, Kansas must respect the 
right of same-sex couples to marry93 notwithstanding the Kansas 
Constitution’s explicit prohibition on that right.94  But these constitutional 
rights do not represent a ceiling.  The states are free to afford greater 
protections for constitutional rights than the federal constitutional 
minimum, provided that they do not violate some other constitutional 
provision.95 
 
 87. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 (prohibiting states from passing “any Bill of Attainder, ex post 
facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts”). 
 88. See George Rutherglen, State Action, Private Action, and the Thirteenth Amendment, 94 VA. 
L. REV. 1367, 1380–91 (2008) (discussing the transformative effects of the Reconstruction 
amendments on the balance between state and federal power, and the tension surrounding the effects 
on slavery).  
 89. 109 U.S. 3, 17 (1883) (“In this connection it is proper to state that civil rights, such as are 
guarantied [sic] by the Constitution against State aggression, cannot be impaired by the wrongful acts 
of individuals, unsupported by State authority in the shape of laws, customs, or judicial or executive 
proceedings.”); see also United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 554 (1875) (“The fourteenth 
amendment prohibits a State from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; but this adds nothing to the rights of one citizen as against another.”). 
 90. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873); see also supra notes 20–21 and accompanying text (discussing 
the Court’s reasoning). 
 91. See supra Section II.A.1. 
 92. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 93. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599 (2015). 
 94. See KAN. CONST. art. 15, § 16(a) (“Marriage shall be constituted by one man and one woman 
only.  All other marriages are declared to be contrary to the public policy of this state and are void.”). 
 95. See, e.g., Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2024 (2017) 
(concluding the state could not rely on its own constitution’s establishment clause to deny a church an 
otherwise available playground safety grant because that violated the First Amendment’s Free 
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As a practical matter, during the 1960s and 1970s, most states focused 
on federal law, finding no need to examine the issues under their own 
constitution’s provisions or choosing to align their own state’s 
constitutional jurisprudence with that of the United States Supreme Court.  
With the Court’s subsequent retrenchment, however, some state supreme 
courts have shown a willingness to extend protections under their own 
constitutions to rights that the United States Supreme Court has declined 
to recognize.96  These developments provide context for the Kansas 
Supreme Court’s decision in Hodes & Nauser. 
As the United States Constitution’s protections for abortion rights has 
become increasingly uncertain, the extent to which state constitutions 
protect that right has taken on greater significance.  The plaintiffs in Hodes 
& Nauser sought a resolution of this question by expressly declining to 
rely on federal law when challenging the Unborn Child Protection from 
Dismemberment Act.97  This choice was clearly intended to force the 
Kansas courts to decide whether the Kansas Constitution protects abortion 
rights. 
B. Unpacking the Hodes & Nauser Opinion 
The decision in Hodes & Nauser was much anticipated.  The 
complaint was initially filed in June, 2015, and the district court granted a 
temporary injunction five days later.98  That decision was affirmed by an 
evenly divided en banc Kansas Court of Appeals in January of 2016, and 
the Kansas Supreme Court granted review in April of that year.99  The 
Kansas Supreme Court, however, did not issue its decision until three 
 
Exercise Clause); see also PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 88 (1980) (concluding 
that recognition of state constitutional right to protest in privately owned shopping center did not 
violate owner’s property rights under the Takings Clause or First Amendment rights). 
 96. Most prominently, in the aftermath of Bowers, many states relied on their own constitutions 
to recognize a right to same sex intimacy.  See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 576 (2003) (“The 
courts of five different States have declined to follow [Bowers] in interpreting provisions in their own 
state constitutions parallel to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” (citing Jegley v. 
Picado, 80 S.W.3d 332 (Ark. 2002); Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18, 24 (Ga. 1998); Gryczan v. State, 
942 P.2d 112 (Mont. 1997); Campbell v. Sundquist, 926 S.W.2d 250 (Tenn. App. 1996); 
Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992))).  Likewise, state courts recognized the right 
of same-sex couples to marry long before the United States Supreme Court did.  See Obergefell, 135 
S. Ct. at 2610 (compiling state supreme court decisions recognizing the right of same-sex couple to 
marry).   
 97. See Hodes & Nauser, MDs, P.A. v. Schmidt, 440 P.3d 461, 470 (Kan. 2019) (“[T]he question 
asserted by the Doctors [is] whether the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights independently protects a 
woman’s right to decide whether to continue a pregnancy.”).   
 98. Hodes & Nauser, MDs, P.A. v. Schmidt, No. 2015CV000490, 2015 WL 13065200, at *1 (D. 
Kan. June 30, 2015). 
 99. Hodes & Nauser, MDs, P.A. v. Schmidt, 368 P.3d 667 (Kan. Ct. App. 2016).  
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years later, in April of 2019.100  The court’s opinion was a lengthy one, 
reflecting the thorough research and careful deliberation that befits such 
an important question.  Nonetheless, the logic of the opinion is 
straightforward and consists of three basic propositions: 
• Section 1 of the Kansas Constitution’s Bill of Rights protects the 
fundamental right to make decisions about parenting and 
procreation that extend to a woman’s decision whether to continue 
a pregnancy.101 
• State laws that burden fundamental rights, including a woman’s 
right to make decisions concerning her pregnancy, are invalid 
unless they can survive strict scrutiny.102 
• The plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their claim 
that the Unborn Child Protection Act burdened a woman’s right 
to make decisions concerning her pregnancy and could not survive 
strict scrutiny.103 
Although a general summary highlighting the key elements of the 
court’s reasoning is essential to understanding Hodes & Nauser’s 
implications for constitutional rights in Kansas, a detailed description of 
the court’s extended discussion of the historical and precedential 
foundations for its conclusions is not necessary here. 
1. Recognition of Right 
Section 1 of the Kansas Bill of Rights provides that “[a]ll men are 
possessed of equal and inalienable natural rights, among which are life, 
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.”104  The Kansas Supreme Court’s 
recognition of a fundamental right is premised on its interpretation of this 
provision, as encapsulated in the following statement by the court: 
 Our analysis leads us to the conclusion that section 1 of the Kansas 
Constitution Bill of Rights acknowledges rights that are distinct from and 
broader than the United States Constitution and that our framers intended 
these rights to be judicially protected against governmental action that 
does not meet constitutional standards.  Among the rights is the right of 
personal autonomy.  This right allows a woman to make her own 
decisions regarding her body, health, family formation, and family life—
 
 100. See Hodes & Nauser, 440 P.3d 461. 
 101. Id. at 502–03. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights § 1 
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decisions that can include whether to continue a pregnancy.105 
Unpacking this language, it subsumes several key propositions relating to 
the meaning of section 1, the role of the courts in enforcing its provisions, 
and the specific content of the rights protected. 
First, the court interpreted section 1 as protecting rights that are 
“distinct from and broader than” those protected by the United States 
Constitution.106  In particular, as developed by the court, the provision 
expressly refers to “natural rights,” thus linking it to the natural rights 
philosophy of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.107  This text and 
history indicates that these rights pre-exist the constitution and are, thus, 
inherently nontextual in nature.108  It further indicates that the content of 
these nontextual rights should be derived from the principles of the natural 
rights philosophy, which the court understood to include “the principle that 
individuals should be free to make choices about how to conduct their own 
lives, or, in other words, to exercise personal autonomy.”109 
Second, the court emphasized that the history of the provision 
indicated that the Kansas Constitution’s framers intended for the judiciary 
to enforce these rights, rejecting the state’s contention that section 1 did 
not create judicially enforceable rights.110  After reviewing the drafting 
history of section 1, which provided no clear answers to the question of 
judicial enforceability,111 the court emphasized that many other state 
constitutions in existence at the time contained similar provisions and that 
these provisions had been judicially enforced, suggesting that the framers 
would have assumed that the Kansas Constitution’s provisions would also 
be judicially enforceable.112  The court also cited to its own precedents 
indicating that section 1 recognized judicially enforceable rights.113 
 
 105. Hodes & Nauser, 440 P.3d at 471. 
 106. Id. 
 107. See id. at 472–73 (discussing influence of natural rights philosophers, including Locke, 
Hobbes, and Rousseau on the development of state constitutions, including the Kansas Constitution). 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 483. 
 110. See id. at 473–80 (examining drafting history, judicial enforcement of similar provisions in 
other state constitutions, and early Kansas Supreme Court decisions indicating that section 1 is 
judicially enforceable). 
 111. See id. at 474–75 (describing different versions of section 1 that were considered, and the 
eventual emergence of language derived from the Declaration of Independence). 
 112. Id. at 475–76 (observing that “[t]his broad wording of Kansas’s section 1, with its 
unenumerated natural rights guarantee, was not unlike the natural rights guarantees in at least 14 other 
states’ constitutions” and that “[a]pplying these provisions in cases decided before . . . the 1859 
Wyandotte Convention, the courts in many of these 14 states had enforced unenumerated rights 
through judicial orders”). 
 113. See id. at 476–78 (discussing, inter alia, Wright v. Noell, 16 Kan. 601, 603 (1876), and 
Atchison St. Ry. Co. v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 3 P. 284 (Kan. 1884)).  
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The court then turned to the substantive content of the natural rights 
that section 1 protects, identifying three overlapping rights—a right to 
personal autonomy, a right to bodily integrity, and a right to make 
decisions about parenting and pregnancy.114  First, personal autonomy was 
at the heart of the natural rights philosophy of Locke and others.115  
Second, the United States Supreme Court had recognized a natural right 
of personal autonomy.116  Third, state supreme courts, including the 
Kansas Supreme Court, had recognized a natural right of bodily 
integrity.117  Finally, the concepts of liberty and the pursuit of happiness 
encompassed the right to make decisions about parenting and 
procreation.118 
It followed, therefore, that a woman’s decision whether to continue 
her pregnancy is within the scope of section 1 because pregnancy involves 
a woman’s bodily integrity and her right to make decisions about 
procreation and children.119  The court did, however, dispose of a couple 
of additional points.  First, the court concluded that section 1 protects the 
rights of women as well as men (notwithstanding its language and the 
exclusion of women from political and economic life at the time of its 
drafting).120  Second, the court rejected the State’s argument that territorial 
statutes criminalizing abortion, which were in effect at the time the state 
constitution was adopted, demonstrated that section 1 could not have 
protected abortion rights.121 
2. Strict Scrutiny of Laws Burdening Fundamental Rights 
Having determined that section 1 protected a woman’s natural right to 
control her body and determine whether to continue her pregnancy, the 
question became whether the Unborn Child Protection Act violated that 
 
 114. Id. at 480–83 (relying on natural rights theory, decisions of other state courts, and United 
States Supreme Court decisions).  
 115. Id. at 480–81. 
 116. Id. at 481–82. 
 117. Id. at 482–83. 
 118. Id. at 483. 
 119. Id. at 484–86. 
 120. Id. at 483–84.  A contrary conclusion would, of course, be untenable in today’s world, 
whatever the expectations of the drafters may have been. 
 121. Id. at 486–91.  The court advanced three justifications for this conclusion:  
(1) the history of enactment provides no evidence that the legislation reflected the will of 
the people; (2) these statutes were never tested for constitutionality; and (3) the historical 
record reflects that those at the Wyandotte Convention, while willing to recognize some 
rights for women, refused to recognize women as having all the rights that men had. 
Id. at 486.   
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right.122  In resolving this issue, the Kansas Supreme Court first 
determined that strict scrutiny applied to laws burdening section 1 natural 
rights, and then concluded that the law was likely to fail strict scrutiny.123  
In adopting this analysis, the court rejected the United States Supreme 
Court’s current right-specific approach,124 instead linking section 1 
analysis to the fundamental rights framework that prevailed during the 
1960s and 1970s.125 
The court offered a number of reasons why the strict scrutiny standard 
should apply.  Most fundamentally, it derived from and reflected the 
concept of “inalienable” rights as that term was used in Lockean natural 
rights theory.126  Under Locke’s theory, even natural rights could be 
limited by government action either to protect the rights of others or in 
furtherance of a compelling governmental interest.127  The court then 
linked the requirement of a compelling governmental interest to strict 
scrutiny, observing that its precedents in cases involving concurrent claims 
under section 1 and the Fourteenth Amendment had recognized the three 
levels of ends-means scrutiny (the rational basis test, intermediate 
scrutiny, and strict scrutiny).128  Further, these precedents had applied 
strict scrutiny to fundamental rights claims, including abortion rights 
claims.129 
The court then rejected the undue burden test adopted in Casey, 
offering several justifications.130  First, the undue burden standard has 
proven difficult to apply and understand because it is internally 
contradictory131 and because the United States Supreme Court has not 
 
 122. Id. at 492. 
 123. Id. at 493–98, 502–03. 
 124. Id. at 493–95. 
 125. Id. at 496–98. 
 126. Id. at 492–93. 
 127. Id. (“This means that, as long as an individual remains within her (or his) private domain, she 
may do as she pleases, provided her ‘conduct does not encroach upon the rightful domain of others.  
As long as [her] actions remain within this rightful domain, other persons—including persons calling 
themselves government officials—should not interfere without a compelling justification.’” (alteration 
in original) (quoting Randy E. Barnett, The Proper Scope of the Police Power, 79 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 429, 446 (2004))). 
 128. See id. at 493 (“The United States Supreme Court and this court have adopted a standard for 
courts to apply when determining if the government has met its burden of establishing a compelling 
justification for enactments.  The standard is referred to as ‘strict scrutiny.’”). 
 129. Id. 
 130. See id. at 493–97. 
 131. The court observed that the undue burden test tells states that they “cannot act with the 
purpose of creating obstacles” to a woman’s choice, but that they can “act with the purpose of 
discouraging abortion.”  Id. at 494 (quoting Erwin Chemerinsky & Michele Goodwin, Abortion: A 
Woman’s Private Choice, 95 TEX. L. REV. 1189, 1219–20 (2017)).  
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clarified its relation to the traditional levels of scrutiny.132  Second, the test 
requires courts to make inherently subjective judgments about the burdens 
imposed by regulations that impact women of varying circumstances in 
different ways.133  Third, although there were no cases directly on point, 
the Kansas Supreme Court’s precedents indicate that strict scrutiny is the 
proper standard for fundamental rights claims.134 
Finally, and most importantly, the court emphasized that strict scrutiny 
should apply because “it is our obligation to protect (1) the intent of the 
Wyandotte Convention delegation and voters who ratified the Constitution 
and (2) the inalienable natural rights of all Kansans today” and “the strict 
scrutiny test best protects those natural rights that we today hold to be 
fundamental.”135  In this regard, the undue burden test is insufficiently 
rigorous because it eases the State’s burden of proof to establish that a law 
is narrowly tailored to further the state’s interests and does not require the 
State to establish that its interests are compelling.136 
3. Applying Strict Scrutiny 
Having established the applicable constitutional framework, the 
Kansas Supreme Court considered whether the plaintiffs’ constitutional 
challenge to the Unborn Child Protection Act was likely to succeed on the 
merits.137  As a preliminary matter, the court disposed of the State’s 
argument that the statute was entitled to a presumption of 
constitutionality.138  It then concluded that the lower courts had improperly 
applied the undue burden test to analyze the claim, but that a remand was 
unnecessary because the findings and analysis of the lower courts 
established that the statute could not survive strict scrutiny.139 
Many Kansas cases have repeated the general proposition that statutes 
are entitled to a presumption of constitutionality—a mantra that expresses 
 
 132. Id. (“At least one author has referred to the Casey standard as ‘[a] form of intermediate 
scrutiny.’” (quoting Richard H. Fallon Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1299 
(2007))). 
 133. Id. at 495. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 496. 
 136. Id. at 497 (“Simply put, the undue burden standard—both as set out in Hellerstedt, and in the 
concurring opinion, lacks the rigor demanded by the Kansas Constitution for protecting the right of 
personal autonomy at issue in this case.” (citation omitted)).  Likewise, the court rejected the dissent’s 
argument that the rational basis test should apply.  See id. at 497 (“For similar reasons we also reject 
the dissent’s position that a governmental regulation, such as S.B. 95, is constitutional as long as it is 
not arbitrary, irrational, or discriminatory and is reasonably related to the common welfare.”).  
 137. Id. at 498. 
 138. Id. at 498–99. 
 139. Id. at 499–500. 
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respect for the legislature as a coequal and politically accountable branch 
of government and reflects a broad posture of judicial restraint.140  On the 
other hand, many Kansas cases invalidate Kansas statutes without 
mentioning or applying the presumption.141  In Hodes & Nauser, the court 
made clear that the applicability of the presumption is a function of the 
level of scrutiny that applies, rather than a freestanding principle of 
judicial restraint that applies to all forms of legislative action.142  In 
particular, the presumption is a manifestation of deferential review under 
the rational basis test and does not apply under strict scrutiny, in which the 
burden is on the state to show that a law furthers a compelling interest and 
is necessary and/or narrowly tailored to that end.143 
The Kansas Supreme Court then concluded that the trial court had 
abused its discretion by applying the wrong legal standard (the undue 
burden test), but that the trial court had correctly ruled that the plaintiffs 
were likely to succeed on the merits.144  Insofar as strict scrutiny is a more 
rigorous standard than the undue burden test, this conclusion is hardly 
surprising since the likely success of a challenge under strict scrutiny 
would seem to follow a fortiori from the likely success of a challenge 
under the undue burden test.  Nonetheless, the Kansas Supreme Court 
examined the findings and conclusions of the lower court to confirm that 
a remand for reconsideration under the proper test was unnecessary.145 
The court of appeals plurality concluded that the Unborn Child 
Protection Act was invalid in light of Stenberg v. Carhart146 and Gonzales 
 
 140. See, e.g., id. at 498–99 (“[G]enerally, ‘[a] statute comes before the court cloaked in a 
presumption of constitutionality and it is the duty of the one attacking the statute to sustain the burden 
of proof.’” (alteration in original) (quoting State ex rel. Schneider v. Liggett, 576 P.2d 221, 226 (Kan. 
1978))).   
 141. See, e.g., Dissmeyer v. State, 249 P.3d 444, 449 (Kan. 2011) (invalidating prohibition of 
certain machines used for gambling as overbroad without mentioning presumption of 
constitutionality); Darling v. Kan. Water Office, 774 P.2d 941, 944–46 (Kan. 1989) (invalidating a 
statute that eliminated civil service provisions in violation of substantive and procedural due process 
without mentioning the presumption of constitutionality). 
 142. Id. at 673 (observing that when strict scrutiny applies “the burden of proof is shifted from 
plaintiff to defendant and the ordinary presumption of validity of the statute is reversed” because 
“government infringement of a fundamental right is inherently suspect” (quoting Farley v. Engelken, 
740 P.2d 1058, 1063 (Kan. 1987))). 
 143. See supra notes 45–46 and accompanying text.  It is less clear, however, whether and how 
the presumption applies in the context of intermediate scrutiny, the undue burden test, or other tests 
for the validity of state action burdening constitutional rights.  See infra Part III.   
 144. Hodes & Nauser, 440 P.3d at 499–500. 
 145. Id. at 500–01. 
 146. 530 U.S. 914, 922 (2000) (invalidating a Nebraska statute prohibiting “partial birth” 
abortions). 
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v. Carhart,147 both United States Supreme Court decisions.148  Like Hodes 
& Nauser, those cases involved statutes prohibiting “partial birth” 
abortions, such as dilation and evacuation (D & E), the most common and 
usually the safest method of second trimester abortion, and dilation and 
extraction (D & X or intact D & E).149  Stenberg invalidated a Nebraska 
partial birth abortion law because it did not contain an exception for the 
life and health of the mother and because it subjected doctors performing 
such procedures to criminal prosecution under a vague standard that 
applied to both methods.150  Gonzales v. Carhart distinguished Stenberg 
and upheld the federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, which 
prohibited only the D & X method, emphasizing that the D & E method, 
which is usually the safest method, remained available.151 
The Kansas Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeals plurality 
that, taken together, these cases stand for the proposition that “[a] 
regulation that prevents [a woman] from accessing the safest method of 
abortion for her places an undue burden on that right.”152  The trial court’s 
findings showed that the Unborn Child Protection Act, which prohibits the 
D & E method, violates this principle, especially insofar as the state had 
previously prohibited the D & X method.153  Thus, the Kansas Supreme 
Court concluded, “even though we would apply what we view as the more 
demanding strict scrutiny standard for the State to meet, doing so would 
not change the conclusions reached by the trial court.”154 
The court thus affirmed the grant of a preliminary injunction and 
remanded for a trial on the merits, in which the validity of the Unborn 
Child Protection Act would depend on whether the State can satisfy strict 
 
 147. 550 U.S. 124, 132–33, 135 (2007) (distinguishing Stenberg and upholding a federal statute 
limiting use of “dilation and evacuation” procedures). 
 148. Hodes & Nauser, 440 P.3d at 500–01. 
 149. See Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 925–29; Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 136–40.  The term “partial-birth” 
abortion is a political term coined by right to life advocates and used in the title of most statutes 
limiting certain late term abortion methods.  The medical terms for the abortion procedures involved 
are “dilation and evacuation” and “dilation and extraction.”  
 150. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 929–30 (“We conclude that [Nebraska’s statute violates the Federal 
Constitution] for at least two independent reasons.  First, the law lacks any exception ‘for the 
preservation of the . . . health of the mother.’  Second, it ‘imposes an undue burden on a woman’s 
ability’ to choose a D & E abortion, thereby unduly burdening the right to choose abortion itself.” 
(alteration in original) (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874, 879 
(1992))).   
 151. See 550 U.S. at 164 (“The conclusion that the Act does not impose an undue burden is 
supported by other considerations.  Alternatives are available to the prohibited procedure.  As we have 
noted, the Act does not proscribe D & E.”).   
 152. Hodes & Nauser, 440 P.3d at 500. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at 501. 
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scrutiny.155  In doing so, the court observed that “the State is certainly free 
to assert any interests it believes compelling and show how [the Act] is 
narrowly tailored to those interests.”156  The Kansas Supreme Court 
acknowledged that the trial court had a “heavy task ahead of it,” because 
it would have to “grapple with one of the most divisive issues of our time,” 
“take into account advances in science that have blurred the sharp 
trimester-based lines used in Roe’s strict scrutiny analysis,” and maintain 
“a deep awareness that the outcome of this case could generate a profound 
and personal consequence for many women.”157 
III. IMPLICATIONS OF HODES & NAUSER 
As the foregoing discussion makes clear, Hodes & Nauser decouples 
the analysis of individual rights in Kansas from the United States Supreme 
Court’s current right-specific doctrine, linking it instead to the 
fundamental rights framework that prevailed during the 1960s and 1970s.  
This approach to the analysis has profound implications not only for 
abortion rights, but also for the recognition of other fundamental rights 
under section 1 of the Kansas Bill of Rights and for the application of other 
provisions of the Kansas Bill of Rights. 
A. Implications for Abortion Rights 
Insofar as the specific question in Hodes & Nauser related to abortion 
rights, the decision has the most direct and immediate impact on abortion 
rights in Kansas.  It is clear that Hodes & Nauser provides greater 
protection for abortion rights than the corresponding federal doctrine by 
(1) creating an independent right that would be unaffected by a United 
States Supreme Court decision overruling Roe and Casey;158 and (2) 
adopting strict scrutiny, rather than the undue burden test, for laws 
burdening abortion rights.159  Nonetheless, Hodes & Nauser is less clear 
about how strict scrutiny should apply or the constitutionality of the state’s 
other abortion regulations. 
As an initial matter, Hodes & Nauser means that constitutional 
protection for abortion rights in Kansas is not dependent on whether the 
United States Supreme Court adheres to Roe v. Wade and Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.  Given the uncertain 
 
 155. Id. at 502–04. 
 156. Id. at 503. 
 157. Id. 
 158. See id. at 472–80. 
 159. Id. at 493–99. 
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future of those cases in the wake of recent appointments to the Court, the 
significance of that result is undeniable.160  On the other hand, the 
recognition of abortion rights under the Kansas Constitution could be 
reversed by a state constitutional amendment,161 in which case, the United 
States Supreme Court’s abortion rights jurisprudence would become the 
constitutional floor.162 
Even if Roe and Casey are not overturned, section 1 of the Kansas Bill 
of Rights will afford greater protection for abortion rights than current 
federal law because strict scrutiny, rather than the undue burden test, 
applies to laws that regulate abortions.163  Strict scrutiny differs from the 
undue burden test in four critical ways: 
• Burdens That Trigger Protection—Under strict scrutiny, abortion 
rights protections are triggered by any sort of burden on access to 
abortion, while the undue burden test is only violated when the 
state creates a substantial obstacle.164 
 
 160. At the time of this writing, the Supreme Court had just heard oral argument in Russo v. June 
Medical Services, which addresses the validity of a Louisiana law that is similar to the one invalidated 
in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt.  See Amy Howe, Argument Analysis: Justices Grapple with 
Louisiana Abortion Law (Updated), SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 4, 2020, 12:28 PM), https://www 
.scotusblog.com/2020/03/argument-analysis-justices-grapple-with-louisiana-abortion-law/ [https:// 
perma.cc/D3NS-EMC2] (analyzing oral arguments); see also Gee v. June Med. Servs., LLC, 140 S. 
Ct. 35 (2019) (mem.) (granting certiorari).  The Court’s decision in Gee will likely tell us a great deal 
about the future of abortion rights under the United States Constitution. 
 161. Thus, abortion opponents have introduced identical resolutions to amend the Kansas 
Constitution so as to overrule Hodes & Nauser.  See H.R. Con. Res. 5019, 2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 
2020) (“[T]he constitution of the state of Kansas does not require government funding of abortion and 
does not create or secure a right to abortion.”); S. Con. Res. 1613, 2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2020) 
(same).  Under article 14, section 1 of the Kansas Constitution, such an amendment must be approved 
by two-thirds of the members of each house and then presented to the voters for approval.  KAN. 
CONST. art. XIV, § 1.  The Kansas Constitution imposes no limits on the content of such an amendment 
(nor could it), which can be used to overturn Kansas Supreme Court decisions or deny the recognition 
of constitutional rights under the Kansas Constitution. 
 162. Another proposed amendment, introduced before the Hodes & Nauser decision, would 
guarantee equal rights to “every human being from the beginning of the biological development of 
that human being, including fertilization.”  H.R. Con. Res. 5004, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2019); 
S. Con. Res. 1604, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2019).  This amendment, however, could not prevent 
enforcement of federally recognized abortion rights, because the United States Constitution is “the 
supreme Law of the Land; . . . any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary 
notwithstanding.”  U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (emphasis added). 
 163. See Hodes & Nauser, 440 P.3d 461, 496 (Kan. 2019).  
 164. Whole Woman’s Health might be read to mean that, even absent a substantial obstacle, health 
regulations that serve no purpose other than to make providing abortions more difficult and costly 
violate the undue burden test.  See Meghan Harper, Comment, Making Sense of Whole Woman’s 
Health v. Hellerstedt: The Development of a New Approach to the Undue Burden Standard, 65 U. 
KAN. L. REV. 757, 759 (2017) (arguing that Whole Woman’s Health establishes a “Rational Basis with 
Bite Balancing Test,” under which a court first applies “the more stringent rational basis with bite test 
and then considers whether the benefits created by the law outweigh any burden the law places on a 
woman’s access to an abortion”).  Even if the Supreme Court’s new conservative majority does not 
overrule Roe and Casey, it seems unlikely that it will continue to apply the arguably heightened version 
of that test applied in Whole Woman’s Health.  
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• The State’s Burden of Proof—When strict scrutiny is triggered, 
the state must establish that its actions are justified, while the 
burden of proof under the undue burden test is uncertain at best 
and may rest on the party challenging the statute.165 
• The Weight of State Interests That Justify Regulation—Under 
strict scrutiny, laws burdening abortion rights can be sustained 
only if they further a compelling governmental interest, while the 
undue burden test may be satisfied by lesser state interests, 
depending on the nature of the burden.166 
• The Close Fit Between the State’s Means and Its Ends—Under 
strict scrutiny, the state must also prove that its regulation of 
abortion is (a) necessary in the sense that its compelling interest 
could not be served by less burdensome means and (b) narrowly 
tailored in the sense that the regulation is not over or under 
inclusive.167 
Nonetheless, while the general parameters of strict scrutiny are clear, 
Hodes & Nauser offers relatively little guidance on its application.168 
In particular, it is unclear whether the pre-Casey United States 
Supreme Court abortion precedents applying strict scrutiny will be 
controlling under section 1 of the Kansas Bill of Rights.  The application 
of strict scrutiny in Roe produced a “trimester framework” that resulted 
from the analysis of two state interests that might support laws regulating 
abortion—protecting the life and health of the pregnant woman and 
protecting the life of the unborn child.169  In the Court’s view, the State’s 
interest in protecting the life and health of the pregnant woman did not 
become compelling until the second trimester, because before that point in 
the pregnancy having an abortion would be safer than carrying the child 
to term.170  And while the State’s interest in protecting the life of an unborn 
 
 165. Id. at 761–64. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. See 440 P.3d at 682 (“In its merits resolution, the trial court will ‘adopt an attitude of active 
and critical analysis,’ as it performs its ‘searching judicial inquiry.’  As it does so, it should remain 
mindful . . . [that] ‘[c]ourts have no power to overturn a law enacted by the legislature within 
constitutional limitations, even though the law may be unwise, impolitic or unjust.’” (first quoting Sate 
ex rel. Schneider v. Liggett, 576 P.2d 221, 227 (Kan. 1978); then quoting Johnson v. California, 543 
U.S. 499, 506 (2005); and then quoting Harris v. Shanahan, 387 P.2d 771, 791 (Kan. 1963))). 
 169. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162–64 (1973).  Roe also noted that a state might ban abortions 
on the theory that unwanted pregnancies act as a deterrent against extramarital sex, but that no one 
had advanced that justification for the law in question.  Id. at 148 (“It has been argued occasionally 
that these laws were the product of a Victorian social concern to discourage illicit sexual conduct.  
Texas, however, does not advance this justification in the present case, and it appears that no court or 
commentator has taken the argument seriously.”). 
 170. Id. at 163. 
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child existed throughout a pregnancy, that interest did not become 
compelling until the third trimester, which (at the time of Roe) reflected 
the point at which an unborn child would be viable outside the mother’s 
womb.171  Thus, under Roe, the State could not regulate abortion at all 
during the first trimester, it could adopt narrowly tailored laws protecting 
the life and health of the pregnant woman starting with the second 
trimester, and it could ban abortions to protect unborn children in the third 
trimester—provided it made exceptions for the life and health of the 
mother. 
In the aftermath of Roe, the Court applied its trimester framework to 
several different kinds of abortion regulations, including: (1) abortion 
funding restrictions; (2) medical regulations; (3) informed consent and 
waiting requirements; (4) third party notification and consent 
requirements; and (5) limits on postviability abortions. 
• Abortion Funding—The Court upheld funding restrictions 
preventing the use of public moneys for abortions on the theory 
that the denial of funding did not burden abortion rights so as to 
trigger strict scrutiny; i.e., the state has no affirmative obligation 
to facilitate the exercise of abortion rights.172 
• Medical Regulations—Although the Court upheld some 
regulation of abortion as a medical procedure, it invalidated 
regulations that were not necessary or narrowly tailored to the 
protection of the lives and health of women undergoing the 
procedure.173 
• Informed Consent and Waiting Periods—The Court also 
invalidated “informed consent” laws requiring that doctors give 
women information designed to discourage them from having an 
abortion (such as information about fetal development, graphic 
descriptions of abortion procedures, disputed statements about 
 
 171. Id. 
 172. See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 326 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 479–80 
(1977).  The Court later relied on Harris and Maher to uphold laws banning the use of any facilities 
receiving public funds (most hospitals) to perform abortions, see Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 
492 U.S. 490, 508–10 (1989), and to uphold regulations prohibiting family planning clinics receiving 
federal funds from discussing abortion, except to discourage it, see Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 
194, 198 (1991). 
 173. See, e.g., Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 765–66 
(1986) (invalidating recordkeeping requirements that the Court found unnecessary and lacking in 
sufficient assurances of patient confidentiality); City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 
462 U.S. 416, 432–39 (1983) (invalidating a municipal ordinance requiring abortions after the first 
trimester to be performed in hospitals because this requirement was not needed to protect women’s 
health); Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 79–81 (1976) (upholding general 
requirements that physicians keep records concerning abortion but invalidating provisions prohibiting 
saline amniocentesis because they forced physicians and women to use less safe methods). 
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health risks of abortions, and information about alternatives (such 
as adoption)), which are typically accompanied by a waiting 
period (usually 24 or 48 hours).174 
• Third Party Notification and/or Consent—Under the Court’s pre-
Casey precedents, spousal consent or notice requirements were 
invalid,175 but parental consent requirements could be upheld if 
they contained a prompt judicial bypass option for minors who 
can show good cause and exceptions for emergencies.176 
• Postviability Abortions—In light of Roe’s statements concerning 
the state’s compelling interest in protecting the life of the unborn 
child after the point of viability, many states enacted laws 
regulating abortions at or near the point of viability, with mixed 
results.177 
While Hodes & Nauser adopted the strict scrutiny test that applied before 
Casey, it left unclear whether the adoption of strict scrutiny also meant the 
adoption of the trimester framework or the array of United States Supreme 
Court precedents applying it. 
This uncertainty raises some interesting questions about the 
application of strict scrutiny to other Kansas laws regulating abortions, 
which are very restrictive.  These regulations include limitations on 
abortion funding,178 stringent recordkeeping and licensure 
requirements,179 informed consent and waiting period requirements,180 
 
 174. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 759–64 (concluding that such laws burdened abortion rights by 
imposing additional costs on women seeking an abortion and could not survive strict scrutiny); City 
of Akron, 462 U.S. at 450–52 (same). 
 175. See Danforth, 428 U.S. at 80–84 (invalidating a statute containing both spousal and parental 
consent but suggesting that a “properly” drafted parental consent requirement may be upheld). 
 176. See, e.g., Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 519 (1990); Planned 
Parenthood Ass’n of Kan. City v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 490–94 (1983); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 
622, 651 (1979). 
 177. Compare Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 765–71 (invalidating (1) recordkeeping requirements 
related to determination of viability because potential for public disclosure would deter women from 
obtaining abortions and (2) requirements for care of a potentially viable fetus that did not make 
exceptions for the life and health of the mother), and Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 390–401 
(1979) (invalidating requirements that physicians determine viability and provide reasonable care for 
a potentially viable fetus as unconstitutionally vague), with Webster, 492 U.S. at 521–22 (upholding 
postviability abortion ban that contained exceptions for the life and health of the mother).  
 178. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6733 (West 2018) (prohibiting, inter alia, expenditure of any funds 
or allowance of any tax credits for abortions).  
 179. See id. § 65-4a09 (directing the Secretary of Health and Environment to promulgate 
regulations for licensure of abortion providers that must at a minimum meet extensive requirements). 
 180. See id. § 65-6709 (imposing extensive information requirements and a 24-hour waiting 
period).  
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parental consent requirements,181 limitations on postviability abortions,182 
and various other restrictions.183  Although some of these provisions were 
likely unconstitutional under the undue burden test,184 the adoption of 
strict scrutiny means that many more are constitutionally vulnerable.185  To 
highlight the questions raised by the application of strict scrutiny under 
Hodes & Nauser, I will focus here on two provisions: informed consent 
and waiting requirements, K.S.A. § 65-6709, and the state’s funding 
restrictions, K.S.A. § 65-6733. 
If the Kansas courts follow the pre-Casey precedents, K.S.A. § 65-
6709’s informed consent and waiting period requirements are invalid,186 
while K.S.A. § 65-6733’s funding restrictions would be valid.187  On the 
other hand, it is possible that the court might apply strict scrutiny 
differently than the pre-Casey United States Supreme Court decisions.  
Thus, for example, the Kansas courts might recognize additional purposes 
as sufficiently compelling to sustain some forms of abortion regulation.  In 
particular, the state might assert a compelling interest in ensuring that 
women’s decisions regarding abortion are fully informed and carefully 
considered in view of the state’s interest in protecting life.  If so, it is 
 
 181. See id. § 65-6705 (requiring written consent of parent(s), subject to the availability of a 
prompt judicial bypass). 
 182. See id. § 65-6703 (prohibiting postviability abortions unless the abortion is necessary to 
preserve the life of the woman or prevent a “substantial and irreversible physical impairment of a 
major bodily function” and specifying that “[n]o condition shall be deemed to exist if it is based on a 
claim or diagnosis that the woman will engage in conduct that would result in her death or in 
substantial and irreversible physical impairment of a major bodily function”). 
 183. See, e.g., id. § 65-6721 (prohibiting “partial birth abortions”); id. §§ 65-6722 to -6724 
(prohibiting abortions on “pain-capable unborn child[ren]”); id. § 65-6726 (prohibiting abortions 
based upon the gender of the fetus). 
 184. In particular, licensure requirements specified by K.S.A. § 65-4a09 and administrative 
regulations thereunder were likely unconstitutional under Whole Woman’s Health, which invalidated 
a Texas law requiring physicians performing abortions to have admitting privileges at nearby hospitals 
and requiring facilities to meet requirements for surgical centers.  Whole Woman’s Health v. 
Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2318–20 (2016).  The Kansas provisions, like those in Texas, are a species 
of what abortion rights advocates refer to as “TRAP laws” (targeted regulation of abortion providers), 
whose primary purpose and effect is to make it more costly for abortion providers to stay in business 
and which lack any demonstrable health or safety benefits.  See Hope Silberstein, Taking on TRAP 
Laws: Protecting Abortion Rights Through Property Rights, 2017 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 737, 737–38 
(2017).  A challenge to the Kansas provisions is currently pending in the Kansas Court of Appeals.  
See Hodes & Nauser, MDs, P.A. v. Norman, No. 19-121046-A (Kan. Ct. App. filed Apr. 17, 2019). 
 185. See, e.g., Tr. Women Found. v. Bennett, No. 19-121693-A (Kan. Ct. App. filed Aug. 19, 
2019) (appealing trial court order denying preliminary injunction in challenge to statutory requirement 
that medication abortions must be administered by physicians and thereby preventing use of 
telemedicine). 
 186. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.  Casey overruled those decisions, concluding that 
such requirements did not impose an undue burden because the ultimate decision whether to have an 
abortion remained with the pregnant woman.  See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 
833, 881–87 (1992). 
 187. See supra note 172 and accompanying text. 
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possible that K.S.A. § 65-6709 could survive strict scrutiny. 
Conversely, it is also possible that the Kansas courts would reject the 
United States Supreme Court decisions upholding abortion funding 
restrictions, such as Maher v. Roe,188 Harris v. McRae,189 and Webster v. 
Reproductive Health Services.190  Maher, Harris, and Webster rest on the 
premise that the denial of funding did not impose any burdens on the 
exercise of abortion rights because the government is not the cause of a 
woman’s inability to pay for an abortion and the government has no 
affirmative duty to enable the exercise of constitutional rights.191  A 
number of commentators have criticized this reasoning, which is 
symptomatic of the broader problem of “unconstitutional conditions” in 
which the government conditions a benefit it need not provide on the 
relinquishment of constitutional rights.192  The Kansas Supreme Court 
might reject this analysis, concluding instead that the exclusion of abortion 
procedures from otherwise broadly available funding for medical 
treatment or facilities has the effect of burdening the exercise of abortion 
rights so as to trigger strict scrutiny. 
In sum, while Hodes & Nauser adopts strict scrutiny as the applicable 
standard, that standard might be applied more or less aggressively, so as 
to replicate the pre-Casey United States Supreme Court doctrine, provide 
somewhat less protection to abortion rights, or provide even more 
protections than the pre-Casey decisions.  One thing that is certain, 
however, is that we may expect constitutional challenges to many Kansas 
statutes regulating abortion.193 
 
 188. 432 U.S. 464, 480 (1977) (upholding a ban on Medicaid funding for abortions except to save 
the life and health of the mother). 
 189. 448 U.S. 297, 326 (1980) (upholding a ban on Medicaid funding for abortions except to save 
the life and health of the mother). 
 190. 492 U.S. 490, 509, 512 (1989) (relying on Harris and Maher to uphold a ban on abortions in 
any facility receiving public funding). 
 191. See, e.g., Harris, 448 U.S. at 316 (“[A]lthough government may not place obstacles in the 
path of a woman’s exercise of her freedom of choice, it need not remove those not of its own 
creation.”). 
 192. See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1440 
(1989) (observing that in the abortion funding cases the Court “wholly ignores the question whether 
the selective subsidy program will deter women from having abortions in the first place—that is, 
whether it makes childbirth an option that poor women cannot refuse and thereby ‘coerces’ 
reproductive choice” and “assumes without explanation that the baseline from which to measure any 
penalty is no funding for abortion, rather than funding for all medical needs including those related to 
reproduction”). 
 193. Of course, if Hodes & Nauser is reversed by constitutional amendment, strict scrutiny will no 
longer apply.  Nonetheless, many of the current Kansas statutes may be vulnerable under the undue 
burden test—as reflected in the lower court’s decision in Hodes & Nauser itself.  See supra note 184, 
discussing pending challenges to Kansas statutes. 
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B. Implications for Other Section 1 Rights 
Hodes & Nauser also has important implications for other kinds of 
rights that section 1 may protect.  Broadly speaking, these rights include 
both other components of “personal autonomy” and rights that may be 
protected by other language in section 1 itself.  These implications have 
already begun to manifest themselves in multiple briefs to the Kansas 
appellate courts that rely on Hodes & Nauser to claim special protection 
for particular rights under section 1. 
1. Personal Autonomy 
The language and reasoning of Hodes & Nauser indicate that the 
“inalienable natural rights” protected under section 1 are rooted in the 
principle of personal autonomy.194  This principle is potentially very broad 
and may encompass a wide array of interests that are central to people’s 
ability to control their own lives.  In light of the court’s analysis, the 
recognition of such rights would not depend on the specific understanding 
of the framers and ratifiers of the Kansas Constitution, but rather upon a 
broader analysis of the philosophical, historical, and jurisprudential 
foundations of the right. 
Most clearly, the court in Hodes & Nauser held that section 1 protects 
the personal autonomy to make decisions concerning “one’s physical 
health, family formation, and family life.”195  These rights, which had 
previously received protection through the United States Supreme Court’s 
right of privacy decisions,196 are now subject to the independent and 
potentially broader protections afforded by section 1 of the Kansas Bill of 
Rights.  In addition, the court’s conceptual analysis of natural rights may 
facilitate the recognition of other nontextual rights.  Two United States 
Supreme Court decisions, Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of 
Health197 and Washington v. Glucksberg,198 highlight the significance of 
this point. 
In Cruzan, the Court recognized that the right to refuse medical 
treatment is so connected to the right of bodily integrity as to be within the 
 
 194. Hodes & Nauser, MDs, P.A. v. Schmidt, 440 P.3d 461, 484–87 (Kan. 2019) (focusing its 
discussion on the Kansas Bill of Rights “inalienable natural rights” language in the context of a 
woman’s “personal autonomy”). 
 195. Id. at 483. 
 196. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 896 (1992). 
 197. 497 U.S. 261 (1990). 
 198. 521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
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liberties protected by due process.199  Nonetheless, the Court applied a 
balancing test rather than strict scrutiny to uphold a state law requiring 
clear and convincing evidence of an incompetent patient’s intent to refuse 
treatment.200  The result in Cruzan might be different under Hodes & 
Nauser because burdens on the right to refuse medical treatment, which 
are clearly encompassed in the concept of “physical health,” would likely 
be subject to strict scrutiny rather than a balancing test.201  While the state 
clearly has a compelling governmental interest in ensuring that the refusal 
of life sustaining treatments in fact reflects the wishes of an incompetent 
patient, it is less clear that requiring clear and convincing evidence is a 
narrowly tailored means of furthering that interest. 
In Glucksberg, the Court declined to recognize a “right to die,” 
characterizing the claim in that case as asserting the right to physician-
assisted suicide.202  Because a right to physician-assisted suicide was 
neither deeply rooted in our nation’s history nor implicit in the concept of 
ordered liberty,203 the Court declined to apply strict scrutiny, instead 
applying the rational basis test to uphold the law.204  This result was largely 
the product of the Court’s narrow definition of the right at issue, an 
approach that Hodes & Nauser rejected.205  Using a broader conceptual 
approach to natural rights under section 1, the Kansas courts might be 
more inclined to treat the right to die as within the scope of personal 
autonomy and the right to make decisions concerning one’s physical 
 
 199. 497 U.S. at 278 (“The principle that a competent person has a constitutionally protected 
liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment may be inferred from our prior decisions.”). 
 200. Id. at 279, 286–87 (“[W]hether respondent’s constitutional rights have been violated must be 
determined by balancing his liberty interests against the relevant state interests.” (quoting Youngberg 
v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321 (1982))). 
 201. In this regard, Hodes & Nauser’s reasons for applying strict scrutiny to laws burdening 
abortions would apply equally to any fundamental right protected by section 1 of the Kansas Bill of 
Rights.  See supra notes 126–36 and accompanying text (discussing court’s reasons for applying strict 
scrutiny in Hodes & Nauser).  
 202. 521 U.S. at 722–23 (rejecting the lower court’s characterization of the issue as whether there 
was a right to die and instead characterizing the question as “whether the ‘liberty’ specially protected 
by the Due Process Clause includes a right to commit suicide which itself includes a right to assistance 
in doing so”). 
 203. Id. at 728 (“The history of the law’s treatment of assisted suicide in this country has been and 
continues to be one of the rejection of nearly all efforts to permit it.  That being the case, our decisions 
lead us to conclude that the asserted ‘right’ to assistance in committing suicide is not a fundamental 
liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause.”). 
 204. Id. at 728–36 (concluding that the ban was reasonably related to the state’s legitimate interest 
in protecting life, policing the ethics of the medical profession, protecting vulnerable persons, and 
avoiding the slippery slope to euthanasia). 
 205. Hodes & Nauser MDs, P.A. v. Schmidt, 440 P.3d 461, 484–86 (Kan. 2019) (defining the right 
at issue broadly in terms of “bodily autonomy”). 
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health.206 
In addition to broad construction and application of the rights 
explicitly recognized in Hodes & Nauser, the court’s analysis might also 
invite recognition of additional rights related to personal autonomy.  It is 
much easier to explain why a broadly conceived right is conceptually 
linked to personal autonomy than it would be to show that a specific right, 
narrowly defined, is deeply rooted in our traditions or implicit in the 
concept of ordered liberty.207  Among other things, fundamental rights 
under section 1 might include rights that have been recognized under 
federal law as among the privileges and immunities of state citizenship, 
including freedom of contract, the right to own property, and the pursuit 
of a calling.208  Other rights, such as the right to vote, might also be 
considered fundamental for purposes of section 1.209 
At this point, it is difficult to predict the full range of rights that might 
be derived from the concept of personal autonomy, but two claims have 
already been advanced in several briefs to the Kansas courts.  All of these 
briefs were submitted by the Kansas Appellate Defender’s Office, which 
argued that criminal convictions should be overturned because statutory 
provisions limiting defenses violated section 1 of the Kansas Bill of 
 
 206. For similar reasons, Kansas courts might decline to follow Abigail Alliance for Better Access 
to Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach, in which the D.C. Circuit declined to recognize a right 
of terminally ill patients to have access to experimental drugs.  495 F.3d 695, 713 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en 
banc).  See also Raich v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 850, 864, 866–87 (9th Cir. 2007) (rejecting the claim 
that “the Due Process Clause embraces a right to make a life-shaping decision on a physician’s advice 
to use medical marijuana”). 
 207. See supra Section II.A.2 (discussing the implications of the right-specific approach for the 
recognition of rights). 
 208. See Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551–52 (E.D. Pa. Cir. Ct. 1823) (recognizing the 
following rights: “Protection by the government; the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to 
acquire and possess property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety; subject 
nevertheless to such restraints as the government may justly prescribe for the general good of the 
whole.  The right of a citizen of one state to pass through, or to reside in any other state, for purposes 
of trade, agriculture, professional pursuits, or otherwise; to claim the benefit of the writ of habeas 
corpus; to institute and maintain actions of any kind in the courts of the state; to take, hold and dispose 
of property, either real or personal; and an exemption from higher taxes or impositions than are paid 
by the other citizens of the state; may be mentioned as some of the particular privileges and immunities 
of citizens, which are clearly embraced by the general description of privileges deemed to be 
fundamental: to which may be added, the elective franchise, as regulated and established by the laws 
or constitution of the state in which it is to be exercised.”). 
 209. Although the right to vote is not directly related to personal autonomy, the United States 
Supreme Court has called it a fundamental right because it is preservative of other rights.  See, e.g., 
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964) (“Especially since the right to exercise the franchise in a 
free and unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil and political rights, any alleged 
infringement of the right of citizens to vote must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized.”).  A right 
that is preservative of personal autonomy might be sufficiently linked to it so as to bring the right 
within the scope of section 1. 
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Rights.210  First, in State v. Phillips211 and State v. Milo,212 the defendant 
relied on Hodes & Nauser to argue that statutory limitations on the right 
of self-defense violated section 1.213  Second, in State v. Genson,214 the 
defendant relied on Hodes & Nauser to argue that statutory limitations on 
the insanity defense violated section 1.215 
2. Additional Section 1 Protections 
Although the Kansas Supreme Court’s opinion in Hodes & Nauser 
focused on the concept of “inalienable natural rights,”216 section 1 also 
contains other language that might be the source of enhanced protection 
for rights.  Specifically, section 1 declares that all people “are possessed 
of equal and inalienable natural rights” and explicitly lists “life, liberty, 
and the pursuit of happiness” as among those rights.217  The court’s 
conclusion that section 1 was intended to provide independent and greater 
protection than the United States Constitution may suggest that section 1 
could be a source of independent equal protection rights and/or protections 
for the right to life under section 1 that could be greater than their federal 
counterparts. 
a. Equal Protection 
In prior decisions, the Kansas Supreme Court has described section 
1’s reference to equal rights as the Kansas Constitution’s “equal protection 
 
 210. See Brief of Appellant at 16–17, State v. Phillips, No. 19-121075-S (Kan. filed Nov. 27, 
2019), 2019 WL 6448485; Brief of Appellant at 7–10, State v. Milo, No. 19-121076-S (Kan. filed 
Nov. 6, 2019), 2019 WL 5866034; Brief of Appellant at 17–21, State v. Genson, No. 19-121014-A 
(Kan. Ct. App. filed Aug. 12, 2019), 2019 WL 3946884.  The Kansas Appellate Defenders Office has 
also relied on Hodes & Nauser to argue that statutory provisions violated rights protected by other 
provisions of the Kansas Bill of Rights.  See, e.g., infra notes 230–35 and accompanying text (Batson 
claims); infra note 286 and accompanying text (right to keep and bear arms under section 4 of the 
Kansas Bill of Rights).  
 211. No. 19-121075-S (Kan. filed Apr. 23, 2019). 
 212. No. 19-121076-S (Kan. filed Feb. 13, 2019). 
 213. See Brief of Appellant at 16–17, State v. Phillips, No. 19-121075-S (Kan. filed Nov. 27, 
2019), 2019 WL 6448485; Brief of Appellant at 7–10, State v. Milo, No. 19-121076-S (Kan. filed 
Nov. 6, 2019), 2019 WL 5866034. 
 214. No. 19-121014-A (Kan. Ct. App. filed Apr. 8, 2019). 
 215. See Brief of Appellant at 17–21, State v. Genson, No. 19-121014-A (Kan. Ct. App. filed Aug. 
12, 2019), 2019 WL 3946884.  This brief also used Hodes & Nauser to argue that the state’s treatment 
of the insanity defense violated the right to a jury under section 5 of the Kansas Bill of Rights.  See id. 
at 9–17.  For further discussion of the implications of Hodes & Nauser for the right to a jury trial, see 
infra note 266–81 and accompanying text. 
 216. See Hodes & Nauser MDs, P.A. v. Schmidt, 440 P.3d 461, 466 (Kan. 2019) (opening the 
opinion by quoting section 1 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights). 
 217. KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights § 1 (emphases added). 
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clause.”218  These cases generally aligned equal protection analysis under 
section 1 with the United States Supreme Court’s equal protection 
doctrine.219  Under this framework, the courts apply different levels of 
scrutiny depending on the nature of a classification on which state action 
is based.220  The rational basis test applies to ordinary classifications,221 
intermediate scrutiny applies to sex or gender based classifications,222 and 
strict scrutiny applies to classifications based on race or national origin.223 
Insofar as Hodes & Nauser declared that section 1 was intended to 
provide independent and greater protection of individual rights than the 
United States Constitution, it may signal a readiness to provide greater 
protection for those adversely affected by arguably discriminatory laws 
 
 218. See, e.g., Bair v. Peck, 811 P.2d 1176, 1182, 1191 (Kan. 1991) (concluding, on certification 
from the federal district court, that statutory provision eliminating health care providers’ vicarious 
liability for negligence of employees did not violate sections 1, 5, or 18 of the Kansas Bill of Rights).  
 219. See, e.g., id. at 1182–83.  Section 2 of the Kansas Bill of Rights also contains equal protection 
language: “All political power is inherent in the people, and all free governments are founded on their 
authority, and are instituted for their equal protection and benefit.”  KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights § 2.  
See also Farley v. Engelken, 740 P.2d 1058, 1061 (Kan. 1987) (stating that while sections 1 and 2 of 
the Kansas Bill of Rights “are given much the same effect as the clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment 
relating to due process and equal protection of the law,” section 2 “has been construed as referring 
only to political privileges and not to property rights,” so that “[w]hen an equal protection challenge 
is raised involving individual personal or property rights, not political rights, the proper constitutional 
section to be considered is section 1”).  
 220. See generally Richard E. Levy, Political Process and Individual Fairness Rationales in the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s Suspect Classification Jurisprudence, 50 WASHBURN L.J. 33, 34–38 (2010) 
(summarizing the various levels of scrutiny and their applicability).  In some cases, the United States 
Supreme Court has elevated scrutiny because a classification burdens a fundamental right.  See supra 
notes 36–38, 45 and accompanying text.  However, that line of cases is likely subsumed in Hodes & 
Nauser’s analysis of inalienable natural rights analysis.  
 221. See, e.g., FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993) (applying rational basis 
scrutiny to a “classification that neither proceeds along suspect lines nor infringes fundamental 
constitutional rights” and upholding the regulation “if there is any reasonably conceived state of facts 
that could provide a rational basis for the classification”).  Although this test is ordinarily very 
deferential, as in Beach Communications, in some cases the Court has applied a more rigorous form 
of the rational basis test to invalidate laws that reflect animus towards a politically unpopular group.  
See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (invalidating a state constitutional amendment 
prohibiting laws banning discrimination based on sexual orientation); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne 
Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (invalidating denial of zoning variance to group home for adults with 
developmental disabilities).  This form of rational basis scrutiny is often referred to as “rational basis 
with bite.”  See infra note 225. 
 222. See, e.g., Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001) (applying intermediate scrutiny to uphold statute 
requiring unwed U.S. fathers, but not U.S. mothers, to have established relationship with child born 
outside the U.S. in order to confer citizenship); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) 
(applying intermediate scrutiny to invalidate males only admissions policy at Virginia Military 
Institute). 
 223. See, e.g., Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499 (2005) (holding that strict scrutiny applied to 
prison regulation providing for new prisoners to be placed temporarily in cells with occupants of the 
same race); Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493–511 (1989) (applying strict scrutiny to 
race-based affirmative action programs). 
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than is currently available under federal doctrine.224  This enhanced 
protection might take various forms, such as more rigorous application of 
the rational basis test to ordinary classifications,225 the application of 
heightened scrutiny to additional classifications (such as disability, age, 
poverty, or sexual orientation),226 or more rigorous scrutiny of laws 
implicating suspect (or quasi-suspect) classifications.227 
One area of potential significance could be the treatment of disparate 
impact claims; i.e., challenges to facially neutral actions that 
disproportionately burden minorities or women.  Under federal equal 
protection doctrine, such laws or policies do not trigger elevated forms of 
scrutiny unless the party challenging the law can prove intentional 
discrimination.228  This rule operates as a major barrier to discrimination 
claims based on a pattern of individual decisions—such as racial profiling 
claims—because a statistical correlation is not sufficient to prove 
 
 224. See Farley v. Engelken, 740 P.2d 1058, 1063 (Kan. 1987) (stating that section 1 “affords 
separate, adequate, and greater rights than the federal Constitution”).  The Kansas Supreme Court in 
Hodes & Nauser relied on this language.  See Hodes & Nauser MDs, P.A. v. Schmidt, 440 P.3d 461, 
470 (Kan. 2019). 
 225. In some cases, the United States Supreme Court has applied what appears to be a more 
rigorous form of rational basis review, commonly referred to as “rational basis with bite,” to 
classifications that are not suspect, but are nonetheless motivated by political animus.  See, e.g., United 
States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 770 (2013) (applying rational basis test to invalidate the federal 
Defense of Marriage Act’s provision excluding valid same-sex marriages from scope of federal 
statutes finding “improper animus or purpose”); Romer, 517 U.S. at 634–36 (applying rational basis 
test to invalidate state constitutional amendment precluding laws to protect against discrimination 
based on sexual orientation); City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 445–51 (applying rational basis test to 
invalidate denial of zoning variance to group home for adults with developmental disabilities); U.S. 
Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 538 (1973) (applying rational basis test to invalidate federal 
statute prohibiting award of food stamps to households with multiple unrelated adults).  The Kansas 
courts might apply this sort of rational basis with bite more broadly. 
 226. See City of Cleburne,, 473 U.S. at 442–47 (declining to recognize mental disability as a 
suspect classification); Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312–15 (1976) (declining to 
recognize age as a suspect classification); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 27–
30 (1973) (declining to recognize wealth as a suspect classification); see also Windsor, 570 U.S. at 
770–75 (applying rational basis with bite without explicitly addressing whether sexual orientation is a 
suspect classification); Romer, 517 U.S. at 635–37 (1996) (applying rational basis test to invalidate 
state constitutional amendment precluding laws to protect against discrimination based on sexual 
orientation). 
 227. For example, the United States Supreme Court has applied what some regard as a less rigorous 
form of strict scrutiny to uphold affirmative action programs in higher education.  See, e.g., Fisher v. 
Univ. of Tex., 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2214–16 (2016) (upholding consideration of race as a factor as 
narrowly tailored to meet the compelling interest in having a diverse student body); Grutter v. 
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343–45 (2003) (same).  The Kansas Supreme Court might rule that diversity 
in higher education is not a compelling governmental interest for purposes of section 1 of the Kansas 
Bill of Rights. 
 228. Pers. Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 281 (1979) (denying the claimant’s undue burden claim 
for lack of “purpose to discriminate on the basis of sex”); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 
(1976) (requiring a showing of “unequal application of the law to such an extent as to show intentional 
discrimination”). 
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intentional discrimination in any particular case.229  Hodes & Nauser 
might support an argument in favor of a lower bar for such claims. 
In State v. Brooks230 and State v. Reed,231 for example, the Kansas 
Appellate Defenders Office argued for greater protections against a 
prosecutor’s discriminatory exercise of peremptory challenges to exclude 
jurors.232  In Batson v. Kentucky,233 the United States Supreme Court 
crafted a three-part framework for proving discriminatory intent in the 
exercise of the peremptory challenge: 
First, a defendant must make a prima facie showing that a peremptory 
challenge has been exercised on the basis of race.  Second, if that 
showing has been made, the prosecution must offer a race-neutral basis 
for striking the juror in question.  Third, in light of the parties’ 
submissions, the trial court must determine whether the defendant has 
shown purposeful discrimination.234 
Although this test was meant to facilitate proof of discriminatory intent, in 
practice courts accept virtually any race neutral justifications offered by 
prosecutors, and the test is very easy for prosecutors to satisfy.235  The 
argument in Brooks and Reed for a more protective version of Batson is 
just the tip of the iceberg of potential equal protection arguments under 
section 1. 
b. The Death Penalty 
Hodes & Nauser’s conclusion that section 1 provides protections that 
are independent of—and greater than—those provided by the United 
States Constitution would also arguably apply to the right to life, which is 
expressly referenced in section 1 as an inalienable natural right.236  While 
 
 229. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 314–20 (1987) (declining to find discriminatory 
intent in the application of the death penalty notwithstanding statistical analysis demonstrating racial 
correlations). 
 230. No. 19-120538-A (Kan. Ct. App. filed Jan. 7, 2019). 
 231. No. 19-120613-A (Kan. Ct. App. filed Jan. 22, 2019). 
 232. Brief of Appellant at 26, State v. Brooks, No. 19-120538-A (Kan. Ct. App. filed Aug. 13, 
2019) (“Under Hodes, section 1 provides more extensive refuge from racial discrimination than the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”); Brief of Appellant at 25, State v. Reed, No. 19-120613-A (Kan. Ct. App. 
filed Sept. 6, 2019) (same). 
 233. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).  
 234. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 328 (2003) (internal citations omitted) (citing Batson, 
476 U.S. at 96–98). 
 235. See, e.g., Jeffrey Bellin & Junichi P. Semitsu, Widening Batson’s Net to Ensnare More Than 
the Unapologetically Bigoted or Painfully Unimaginative Attorney, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1075, 1075 
(2011) (concluding, based on a statistical analysis of cases, that Batson is ineffective because it “is 
easily avoided through the articulation of a purportedly race-neutral explanation for juror strikes”). 
 236. KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights § 1. 
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the right to life might be asserted as the foundation for a variety of 
constitutional claims,237 its most direct application would be as a basis for 
challenging the death penalty in Kansas.238  Indeed, Hodes & Nauser has 
figured prominently in a series of death penalty cases currently pending 
before the Kansas Supreme Court: State v. Carr,239 State v. Cross,240 and 
State v. Flack.241  To provide context for discussing this argument, I will 
begin with some background on the death penalty under federal and state 
law. 
In general terms, although the death penalty is not invalid under the 
United States Constitution, its application must meet the requirements of 
due process and cannot violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition 
against cruel and unusual punishments.  As a result, “a state capital 
sentencing system must: (1) rationally narrow the class of death-eligible 
defendants; and (2) permit a jury to render a reasoned, individualized 
sentencing determination based on a death-eligible defendant’s record, 
personal characteristics, and the circumstances of his crime.”242  The first 
requirement, which reflects the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel 
and unusual punishment, limits the death penalty to crimes that are 
sufficiently heinous to justify its imposition243 and prevents its application 
 
 237. It might, for example, be asserted as the foundation for a constitutional right of self-defense, 
on the theory that the right to life implies a corresponding right to protect it.  Cf. supra notes 211–13 
and accompanying text (discussing claims that the right of self-defense is an inalienable natural right).  
The right to life might also imply a right to die, in the same way that the right to speak includes the 
right not to speak or the right to vote includes the right not to vote.  Cf. supra notes 202–06 and 
accompanying text (discussing possibility that the right to die might be a component of the right to 
make decisions about one’s physical health). 
 238. The Kansas Bill of Rights also contains a prohibition against “cruel or unusual punishment,” 
which might be read as providing independent and greater protections against the imposition of the 
death penalty than the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, but the focus in recent 
cases has been on section 1.  KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights § 9.  See also infra Section III.C (discussing 
implications of Hodes & Nauser for other provisions of the Kansas Bill of Rights). 
 239. See Fifth Supplemental Brief of Appellant, State v. Carr, No. 03-090198-S (Kan. filed Aug. 
16, 2019), 2019 WL 3943081; Fifth Supplemental Brief of Appellant, State v. Carr, No. 03-90044-S 
(Kan. filed Aug. 16, 2019), 2019 WL 3943080.  This is really two separate cases involving the 
infamous Carr brothers, Reginald and Jonathan, who were convicted of a famous and brutal crime 
spree known as the “Wichita Massacre.”  See State v. Carr, 331 P.3d 544 (Kan. 2014) (per curiam) 
(affirming convictions but setting aside death penalty), rev’d, 136 S. Ct. 633 (2016) (concluding that 
Kansas Supreme Court had improperly set aside the death penalty).  The crime has its own Wikipedia 
page.  See Wichita Massacre, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wichita_Massacre [https:// 
perma.cc/A5RV-NLHF] (last visited Mar. 30, 2020). 
 240. See Supplemental Brief of Appellant, State v. Cross, No. 15-114919-S (Kan. Aug. 16, 2019), 
2019 WL 3943082. 
 241. See Supplemental Brief of Appellant, State v. Flack, No. 16-115964-S (Kan. Aug. 16, 2019), 
2019 WL 3943083. 
 242. Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 173–74 (2006). 
 243. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008) (holding that it violated the Eight 
Amendment to impose the death penalty for the rape of a child that neither was intended to nor did 
result in her death).   
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to individuals who lack the requisite culpability.244  The second 
requirement, which reflects due process considerations, necessitates a 
sentencing phase in which the jury hears a broad range of aggravating and 
mitigating factors in a way that is individualized, but also guards against 
the arbitrary imposition of the death penalty.245 
To this point, the Kansas Supreme Court has relied on federal doctrine 
when considering the validity of death penalty statutes.  In State v. 
Kleypas,246 for example, the court applied federal doctrine to uphold the 
Kansas death penalty statute, although it also concluded that the state 
could not provide for the imposition of the death penalty when the 
aggravating and mitigating factors were evenly balanced.247  The Kansas 
Supreme Court later relied on the Kleypas limitation to set aside the death 
penalty in State v. Marsh,248 but the United States Supreme Court reversed, 
concluding that Kleypas and Marsh had misread the Court’s death penalty 
precedents.249 
More recently, in Kansas v. Carr,250 the United States Supreme Court 
again reversed Kansas Supreme Court decisions that applied federal 
doctrine to set aside the death penalty.  In State v. Gleason251 and State v. 
Carr,252 the Kansas Supreme Court set aside the imposition of the death 
penalty in particular cases because the trial court failed to instruct jurors 
that a defendant need only prove by a preponderance of the evidence that 
the mitigating factors outweighed the aggravating factors.  The United 
States Supreme Court, which consolidated these decisions for review, 
rejected this conclusion.253  The United States Supreme Court also rejected 
 
 244. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (holding that imposition of the death 
penalty on juveniles is unconstitutional because of their diminished culpability); Atkins v. Virginia, 
536 U.S. 304 (2002) (holding that imposition of death penalty on defendants with significant 
developmental disabilities is unconstitutional).   
 245. See, e.g., Kansas v. Carr, 136 S. Ct. 633 (2016) (rejecting the Kansas Supreme Court’s 
conclusion that conduct of sentencing phase was constitutionally flawed); Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 
163 (2006) (rejecting the Kansas Supreme Court’s conclusion that the state could not shift the burden 
of proving mitigating factors on the defendant once aggravating factors had been proved). 
 246. 40 P.3d 139 (Kan. 2001) (per curiam). 
 247. Id. at 223–34. 
 248. 102 P.3d 445, 458 (Kan. 2004), rev’d, 548 U.S. 163 (2006) (also abrogating Kleypas in part). 
 249. Marsh, 548 U.S. at 181. 
 250. Carr, 136 S. Ct. at 643–46 (reversing both Gleason and Carr on the issue of instructions and 
Carr on the issue of severing the sentencing hearings). 
 251. 329 P.3d 1102, 1147 (Kan. 2014) (per curiam) (“[C]apital juries in Kansas must be informed 
that mitigating circumstances need not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.”). 
 252. 331 P.3d 544, 707 (Kan. 2014) (per curiam) (concluding that trial court erred “in failing to 
instruct the jury that the existence of mitigating factors need not be proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt”).  The Kansas Supreme Court also concluded in Carr that the trial court erred “in refusing to 
sever the penalty phase of the defendants’ trial.”  Id. at 706–07. 
 253. Carr, 136 S. Ct. at 642–44. 
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the Kansas Supreme Court’s ruling in Carr that the trial court had 
improperly refused to sever the sentencing phase of the codefendants’ 
trial.254 
The Kansas Supreme Court’s recent history thus suggests that it might 
be receptive to arguments for more extensive constitutional protections 
against the death penalty under state, as opposed to federal, law.  In 
particular, the Kansas Supreme Court might conclude that even if federal 
doctrine permits the state to require a defendant to prove that the 
mitigating factors outweigh the aggravating factors, section 1 of the 
Kansas Bill of Rights does not.  On the other hand, the Kansas Supreme 
Court affirmed the imposition of the death penalty after remand in 
Gleason,255 which suggests a willingness to adhere to federal doctrine even 
when it was less protective than the Kansas Supreme Court had thought.  
Nonetheless, Gleason was decided before Hodes & Nauser, which 
arguably signals a greater willingness to decide individual rights questions 
on the basis of state, rather than federal, law. 
The defendants’ briefs in Carr, Cross, and Flack, however, rely on 
Hodes & Nauser to advance a broader challenge to the state’s death 
penalty statute.256  These briefs argue that strict scrutiny should apply to 
the death penalty statute because the right to life is expressly protected as 
fundamental under section 1 of the Kansas Bill of Rights, and that the 
current statute fails strict scrutiny because it is not narrowly tailored to 
further a compelling governmental interest.257  The state, in its response, 
argues that Hodes & Nauser is not relevant to the death penalty because 
courts do not apply fundamental rights analysis to criminal processes and 
lawfully imposed sentences do not violate fundamental rights.258 
 
 254. Id. at 644–46. 
 255. State v. Gleason, 388 P.3d 101, 116 (Kan. 2017). 
 256. See Appellant’s Reply Brief to Fifth Supplemental Brief of Appellee, State v. Carr, No. 03-
90044-S (Kan. filed Nov. 8, 2019), 2019 WL 6027161; Appellant’s Reply Brief to Supplemental Brief 
of Appellee, State v. Carr, No. 03-90198-S (Kan. filed Nov. 7, 2019), 2019 WL 6027162; Fifth 
Supplemental Brief of Appellant, State v. Carr, No. 2003-090044-S (Kan. filed Aug. 16, 2019), 2019 
WL 3943080; Supplemental Brief of Appellant, State v. Carr, No. 2003-090198-S (Kan. filed Aug. 
16, 2019), 2019 WL 3943081; Appellant’s Reply Brief to Supplemental Brief of Appellee, State v. 
Cross, No. 15-114919-S (Kan. filed Nov. 8, 2019), 2019 WL 6027163; Supplemental Brief of 
Appellant, State v. Cross, No. 15-114919-S (Kan. filed Aug. 16, 2019), 2019 WL 3943082; 
Appellant’s Reply Brief to Supplemental Brief of Appellee, State v. Flack, No. 16-115964-S (Kan. 
filed Nov. 7, 2019), 2019 WL 6027164; Supplemental Brief of Appellant, State v. Flack, No. 16-
115964-S (Kan. filed Aug. 16, 2019), 2019 WL 3943083. 
 257. In particular, according to the defendants’ argument, the state’s interest in retribution is not 
compelling and the current death penalty is not narrowly tailored to meet the state’s compelling interest 
in deterrence.   
 258. See Appellee’s Supplemental Brief in Response to Appellant’s Fifth Supplemental Brief at 
4–17, State v. Carr, No. 03-90044-S (Kan. filed Oct. 15, 2019); Appellee’s Supplemental Brief in 
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Applying strict scrutiny to invalidate the death penalty would require 
the Kansas Supreme Court to overrule Kleypas, which it reaffirmed only 
two years ago in State v. Kahler.259  The court also seemed reluctant to 
address broad challenges to the death penalty in Carr and Gleason.260  
Nonetheless, similar considerations did not sway the court in Hilburn v. 
Enerpipe Ltd.,261 discussed below, which relied on Hodes & Nauser to 
overrule recent decisions and recognize a constitutional claim with 
potentially sweeping implications.262  Accordingly, the court’s decisions 
in Carr, Cross, and Flack bear watching. 
C. Implications for Other Kansas Bill of Rights Provisions 
The Kansas Constitution’s Bill of Rights contains a number of other 
provisions protecting a variety of other rights,263 including some with 
federal counterparts264 and some for which there is no corresponding 
federal constitutional provision.265  Although Hodes & Nauser focused on 
interpreting and applying section 1, its analysis may have significance for 
the interpretation and application of these other Kansas Bill of Rights 
provisions.  First, Hodes & Nauser may support interpreting these other 
provisions to afford independent protections that exceed those given by 
the United States Constitution, even when the Kansas provisions are 
similar to federal provisions.  Second, Hodes & Nauser indicated that the 
usual presumption of constitutionality, as reflected in the deferential 
 
Response to Appellant’s Supplemental Brief, State v. Carr, No. 03-90198-S (Kan. filed Oct. 15, 2019); 
see also Brief of Appellee at 93, State v. Flack, No. 2016-115964-S (Kan. filed Oct. 1, 2019), 2019 
WL 4925015 (ignoring Hodes & Nauser and arguing simply that the state should adhere to its 
precedents upholding the death penalty). 
 259. 410 P.3d 105 (Kan. 2018), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 1318 (U.S. Mar. 18, 2019) (No. 18-6135) 
(granting certiorari on the issue of whether the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments permit states to 
abolish the insanity defense). 
 260. See State v. Carr, 331 P.3d 554, 708 (Kan. 2014) (per curiam) (declining to reach issues of 
whether “the death penalty [is] an unconstitutionally disproportionate punishment as applied to aiders 
and abettors of capital murder” and whether “Kansas’ execution protocol protect[s] against 
unnecessary pain”); State v. Gleason, 329 P.3d 1102, 1148 (Kan. 2014) (per curiam) (“Because we 
are vacating Gleason’s death sentence, we decline to consider his constitutional and statutory 
challenges to the death penalty.”). 
 261. 442 P.3d 509 (Kan. 2019). 
 262. Id. (overruling Miller v. Johnson, 289 P.3d 1098 (Kan. 2012), Samsel v. Wheeler Transp. 
Servs., Inc., 789 P.2d 541 (Kan. 1990), and Kan. Malpractice Victims Coal. v. Bell, 757 P.2d 251 
(Kan. 1988)).  For further discussion of Hilburn, see infra notes 266–81 and accompanying text. 
 263. See generally KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights §§ 1–21 (enumerating various rights). 
 264. See, e.g., id. § 3 (right of peaceable assembly); id. § 4 (right to bear arms); id. § 11 (freedom 
of speech and press); id. § 15 (prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures). 
 265. See, e.g., id. § 2 (declaring political power to rest in the people and prohibiting grant of special 
privileges and immunities); id. § 12 (prohibiting forfeiture of estates for crimes); id. § 16 (prohibiting 
imprisonment for debt); id. § 21 (right to hunt, fish, and trap wildlife). 
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rational basis test, does not apply when a state law burdens rights protected 
in the Kansas Bill of Rights. 
The Kansas Supreme Court has already used this sort of analysis in 
Hilburn v. Enerpipe Ltd.,266 which invalidated K.S.A. § 60-19a02, a 
statutory cap on noneconomic damages.  The court had previously upheld 
the statute in Miller v. Johnson,267 which rejected challenges based on 
section 5 and section 18 of the Kansas Bill of Rights.  Section 5 declares 
that “[t]he right of trial by jury shall be inviolate”268 and section 18 
specifies that “[a]ll persons, for injuries suffered in person, reputation or 
property, shall have remedy by due course of law, and justice administered 
without delay.”269 
Miller merged the analysis under these two provisions, ruling that the 
legislature must provide an “adequate and viable substitute when 
modifying a common-law jury trial right under Section 5 or right to 
remedy under Section 18.”270  In other words, the legislature may limit 
traditional judicial remedies subject to trial by jury if it provides a “quid 
pro quo” that offsets the diminishment of a parties’ common law claim.  
The court in Miller concluded that the legislature had provided such a quid 
pro quo because K.S.A. § 60-19a02 was part of a broader system designed 
to ensure that the availability of funds to pay damages.  Thus, the court 
reasoned, “having an available source of recovery of the statutorily 
mandated minimums provides [a plaintiff] with a significant, 
individualized substitute remedy.”271 
Hilburn, however, concluded that this quid pro quo analysis is 
inappropriate for section 5 challenges, overruling Miller and invalidating 
K.S.A. § 60-19a02 as a denial of the right to a jury trial.272  In so doing, 
the court began by relying on Hodes & Nauser to conclude that no 
presumption of constitutionality should apply because “the right protected 
by section 5 is a ‘fundamental interest’ expressly protected by the Kansas 
Constitution Bill of Rights.”273  The court then engaged in an extensive 
 
 266. 442 P.3d 509, 524 (Kan. 2019) (invalidating statutory noneconomic damages cap). 
 267. 289 P.3d 1098, 1109–25 (Kan. 2012). 
 268. KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights § 5. 
 269. Id. § 18. 
 270. 289 P.3d at 1113.  To satisfy the quid pro quo analysis, the court applies a two-step analysis: 
“For step one, we determine whether the modification to the common-law remedy or the right to jury 
trial is reasonably necessary in the public interest to promote the public welfare.”  Id. at 1114.  The 
first step is, in essence, the rational basis test.  Id. 
 271. Id. at 1117. 
 272. The court therefore found it unnecessary to consider the section 18 challenge.  See Hilburn v. 
Enerpipe Ltd., 442 P.3d 509, 511 (Kan. 2019) (“This decision eliminates any necessity of addressing 
Hilburn’s section 18 claim.”). 
 273. Id. at 513. 
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discussion of the quid pro quo test, concluding that it was inconsistent with 
the text of section 5 and that the precedents relied on in Miller did not 
support the application of the test in section 5 (as opposed to section 18) 
cases.274  The court then applied an apparently per se rule that prevents the 
legislature from displacing the jury’s finding of fact, including its findings 
regarding the amount of damages.275 
Hilburn has potentially important implications for other cases 
involving section 5,276 as well as for the application of section 18.  
Consider, for example, the Kansas Workers Compensation scheme, which 
replaces traditional common law tort remedies with an administrative 
system in which compensation is paid according to legislatively 
determined schedules.277  The Kansas courts have upheld the system, 
concluding that it was rationally related to a legitimate state interest and 
provided an adequate quid pro quo.278  Hilburn suggests that the workers 
compensation law, at least in its current form, might be vulnerable to a 
challenge under section 5 and section 18. 
To the extent that the workers compensation system replaces tort 
actions subject to trial by jury with an administrative remedy determined 
without a jury, it may implicate section 5 of the Kansas Bill of Rights.  
Indeed, both Miller and Hilburn referenced concerns that refusal to apply 
a quid pro quo analysis under section 5 might mean that the workers 
compensation system was unconstitutional.  The court in Miller relied on 
this concern to support the application of quid pro quo analysis under 
section 5.279  The court in Hilburn, however, suggested that these concerns 
were misplaced because “[t]he new administrative system of no-fault 
 
 274. See id. at 514–21. 
 275. Id. at 524 (“Regardless of whether an existing damages cap is technically or theoretically 
applied as a matter of law, the cap’s effect is to disturb the jury’s finding of fact on the amount of the 
award.  Allowing this substitutes the Legislature’s nonspecific judgment for the jury’s specific 
judgment.  The people deprived the Legislature of that power when they made the right to trial by jury 
inviolate.”). 
 276. See Brief of Appellant at 31–34, State v. Owens, No. 19-120753-S (Kan. filed Oct. 10, 2019), 
2019 WL 5268837 (relying on Hodes & Nauser to argue that judicial restitution order in criminal 
sentencing violated section 5). 
 277. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-501 to -5127 (West 2018). 
 278. See, e.g., Injured Workers of Kan. v. Franklin, 942 P.2d 591 (Kan. 1997).  The Kansas Court 
of Appeals, however, invalidated the most recent amendments to the schedule of compensation on the 
ground that they went too far in reducing the level of compensation so that there was no longer an 
adequate quid pro quo.  See Johnson v. U.S. Food Serv., 427 P.3d 996 (Kan. Ct. App. 2018) 
(invalidating KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-510d(b)(23)–(24), -510e(a)(2)(B)); see also Pardo v. United 
Parcel Serv., 422 P.3d 1185 (Kan. Ct. App. 2018) (invalidating KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-510d(b)(23) as 
applied on the facts). 
 279. See Miller v. Johnson, 289 P.3d 1098, 1112 (Kan. 2012) (reasoning that retreating from the 
quid pro quo analysis “would collaterally create uncertainty about the constitutionality of the Workers 
Compensation Act”). 
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compensation for injured workers left no common-law cause of action 
upon which Section 5’s jury trial right could act.”280  Under this analysis, 
the right to a jury only attaches if there is a common law cause of action 
tried in a court of law, and section 5 would not constrain the legislature’s 
authority to replace common law rights with administrative remedies.281 
In other words, the legislature’s authority to replace common law 
causes of action with administrative remedies would be constrained only 
by section 18, which under current doctrine allows such measures if there 
is a rational basis for replacing the common law remedy with an 
administrative compensation system and the administrative compensation 
system is an adequate quid pro quo.282  Insofar as a remedy by due course 
of law is explicitly protected under section 18, the rational basis test 
arguably should no longer apply to laws that eliminate common law 
remedies.283  In addition, courts should arguably be less deferential when 
assessing the adequacy of the statutory quid pro quo.284  This result would 
 
 280. Hilburn, 442 P.3d at 520 (quoting Miller, 289 P.3d at 1145 (Beier, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part)). 
 281. Under federal law, by way of contrast, the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial applies to 
administrative adjudications, which may be invalid if they deny the right to trial by jury.  See Atlas 
Roofing Co., Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 430 U.S. 442 (1977).  In most 
cases, however, administrative adjudication of “public rights” is constitutionally permissible because 
such rights were traditionally adjudicated by courts of equity without a jury.  Id. at 450.  In any event, 
however, the Seventh Amendment, does not apply to the states, so this analysis would not be 
controlling.  See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 765, n.13 (2010) (listing the Seventh 
Amendment as among the “handful of the Bill of Rights protections” that have not been incorporated 
by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment so as to be applicable to the states). 
 282. See, e.g., Franklin, 942 P.2d at 603 (“If a remedy protected by due process is abrogated or 
restricted by the legislature, such change is constitutional if [1] the change is reasonably necessary in 
the public interest to promote the general welfare of the people of the state, and [2] the legislature 
provides an adequate substitute remedy to replace the remedy which has been restricted.” (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted) (quoting Lemuz v. Fieser, 933 P.2d 134, 144 (Kan. 1997))). 
 283. For example, in Tillman v. Goodpasture, the Kansas Court of Appeals relied on the 
presumption of constitutionality to hold that a Kansas statute prohibiting medical malpractice claims 
based on “wrongful life or wrongful birth” did not implicate section 5 or section 18 because those 
provisions only protect causes of action that existed at common law when the Kansas Bill of Rights 
was adopted.  424 P.3d 540, 543 (Kan. Ct. App. 2018) (quoting KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1906(a)).  If 
the Kansas Supreme Court were to treat the cause of action in question as a species of medical 
malpractice action, a type of action that did exist when the Bill of Rights was adopted, then the statute 
might implicate section 18.  If so, then strict scrutiny, rather than the rational basis test, arguably 
should apply.  
 284. An injured worker made this argument in the pending appeal to the Kansas Supreme Court in 
Johnson v. U.S. Food Service, which invalidated K.S.A. § 44-510d(b)(23)–(24) and K.S.A. § 44-
510e(a)(2)(B) because they reduced compensation to the point that the workers compensation law no 
longer provided an adequate pro quo.  427 P.3d 996 (Kan. Ct. App. 2018).  See also Supplemental 
Brief of Appellant at 4–5, Johnson v. U.S. Food Serv., No. 17-117725-S (Kan. filed June 21, 2019), 
2019 WL 3081266 (relying on Hodes & Nauser to argue that “there is no presumption of 
constitutionality in cases dealing with ‘fundamental interests’ protected by the Kansas Constitution” 
and that § 18, like § 5, is a fundamental right so that in such cases “there is no presumption of 
constitutional validity”). 
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present a serious problem for the current workers compensation system, 
insofar as substantive rules protecting workers and levels of compensation 
have eroded to the point that there is arguably no longer an adequate quid 
pro quo for the elimination of common law tort actions.285 
More broadly, Hilburn raises the question what other rights under the 
Kansas Bill of Rights might be considered to be fundamental so as to 
preclude the presumption of constitutionality and justify heightened 
protection under strict scrutiny, per se rules, or other more rigorous forms 
of judicial review.  Thus, for example, in a series of cases the Kansas 
Appellate Defenders Office has relied on Hodes & Nauser to argue for 
strict scrutiny of laws implicating the right to keep and bear arms under 
section 4.286  Similarly, in State v. Beasely,287 a defendant argued that the 
trial court violated section 16 of the Kansas Bill of Rights, which prohibits 
imprisonment for debt, by extending his probation solely on the basis of 
an outstanding debt.288  As this Article was in process, moreover, the 
Kansas Attorney General cited Hodes & Nauser as additional authority to 
support his conclusion that the “religious freedom  protections  in the  
Kansas Constitution’s Bill  of  Rights . . . exceed the religious freedom 
protections in the federal Constitution.” 289  
 
 285. See Franklin, 942 P.2d at 620 (reviewing 1993 amendments to the workers compensation act 
that made “the quid pro quo for the abrogation of the employees’ common-law right to sue an employer 
for negligence . . . less than what it was prior to 1993” but nonetheless upholding the law); id. at 623–
24 (Allegrucci, J., dissenting) (observing that “when the legislature provides a substitute remedy,” it 
“cannot alter the remedy to the point ‘it is no longer a viable and sufficient substitute remedy,’” and 
concluding that “the Workers Compensation Act, as amended, no longer provides an adequate quid 
pro quo” (quoting Bair v. Peck, 811 P.2d 1176, 1191 (Kan. 1991))); see also Blake Saffels, “Death by 
a Thousand Paper Cuts”––How the Kansas Supreme Court Should Stop the State Legislature’s 
Systematic Decimation of Workers Compensation Benefits, 69 U. KAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) 
(discussing legislative actions undermining the Kansas workers compensation system’s quid pro quo 
in light of Hodes & Nauser).  
 286. See Brief of Appellant at 22–27, State v. Valdez, No. 19-121053-A (Kan. Ct. App. filed Dec. 
31, 2019), 2019 WL 7505167 (relying on Hodes & Nauser to challenge statutory provision prohibiting 
possession of firearms by certain convicted felons); Brief of Appellant at 30–34, State v. Smith, No. 
2019-121332-A (Kan. Ct. App. filed Dec. 23, 2019), 2019 WL 7347473 (same); Brief of Appellant at 
37–40, State v. Guebara, No. 18-120994-A (Kan. Ct. App. filed Dec. 5, 2019), 2019 WL 6709204 
(same); Brief of Appellant at 19–24, State v. Baumgarner, No. 19-121092-A (Kan. Ct. App. filed Nov. 
19, 2019), 2019 WL 6340190 (relying on Hodes & Nauser to argue that statutory ban on possession 
of firearm by mentally ill persons subject to involuntary civil commitment violated section 4); Brief 
of Appellant at 29–34, State v. Celestine, No. 19-121091-A (Kan. Ct. App. filed Nov. 18, 2019), 2019 
WL 6340189 (relying on Hodes & Nauser to challenge statutory provision prohibiting possession of 
firearms by certain convicted felons); Brief of Appellant at 6–21, State v. Johnson, No. 19-121187-A 
(Kan. Ct. App. filed Oct. 25, 2019), 2019 WL 5640039 (same). 
 287. No. 19-120,477-A (Kan. Ct. App. filed Dec. 21, 2018). 
 288. Brief of Appellant at 5–12, State v. Beasley, No. 19-120,477-A (Kan. Ct. App. filed Dec. 5, 
2019), 2019 WL 6709205. 
 289. Memorandum from Derek Schmidt, Kan. Att’y Gen., to Kan. Prosecutors & Law Enf’t 5 
(Apr. 8, 2020), https://ag.ks.gov/docs/default-source/documents/addendum-1-to-law-enforcement 
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It remains to be seen whether the Kansas Supreme Court will 
recognize other Bill of Rights protections as fundamental so as to preclude 
a presumption of constitutionality and justify the application of higher 
standards of review.  Arguably, any right expressly included in the Kansas 
Bill of Rights should be considered fundamental.  Indeed, Justice Stegall, 
who concurred in Hilburn, objected to the recognition of some rights, but 
not others, as fundamental, suggesting that “[p]erhaps courts should 
exercise de novo review over Kansas statutes when any portion of our 
Constitution is implicated, not only when judicially favored rights are 
involved.”290 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Kansas Supreme Court decision in Hodes & Nauser has profound 
implications for constitutional rights in Kansas.  The decision is a 
declaration of independence from the United States Supreme Court’s 
current constitutional rights jurisprudence, not only with respect to 
abortion rights, but also with respect to a potentially broad array of other 
rights. 
The full import of the decision remains to be seen, but in Hilburn the 
Kansas Supreme Court already relied on Hodes & Nauser to provide 
expanded protection for the right to a jury trial, overruling recent precedent 
to the contrary.  Litigants have begun to rely on Hodes & Nauser in support 
of a variety of other constitutional claims.  Some of these claims, like other 
challenges to anti-abortion laws, the asserted right of self-defense, 
enhanced equal protection safeguards, and challenges to the death penalty, 
arise under section 1.  Others assert enhanced protections under additional 
provisions of the Kansas Bill of Rights, including sections 4, 5, 16, and 
18.  Still other rights claims may be forthcoming. 
Some final observations about the decision are also in order.  First, 
even if right to life advocates succeed in overruling the holding of Hodes 
& Nauser by a constitutional amendment eliminating the right to abortion, 
such a result would not affect the court’s underlying analysis.  Thus, Hodes 
& Nauser, bolstered by Hilburn, would continue to support the principle 
that the Kansas Constitution provides independent and greater protection 
 
-duties-and-authorities-memo.pdf?sfvrsn=7a60ac1a_2 [https://perma.cc/M6E2-FUFQ] (advising law 
enforcement personnel not to enforce Kansas Governor’s emergency order extending prohibition on 
mass gatherings to religious gatherings so as to prevent spread of COVID-19).  The Kansas Attorney 
General first cited State v. Smith, 127 P.2d 518 (Kan. 1942), as direct authority for the proposition in 
text, and added the reference to Hodes & Nauser as a “see also generally” reference, with the 
explanatory parenthetical: “(recognizing that the Kansas Constitution’s limits on government action 
may exceed federal limits).”  Id.  
 290. Hilburn v. Enerpipe, Ltd., 442 P.3d 509, 527 (Kan. 2019) (Stegall, J., concurring in part). 
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for rights than the United States Constitution.  Those decisions would also 
continue to support the rejection of any presumption of constitutionality 
and the application of strict scrutiny or other heightened forms of judicial 
review when laws implicate provisions of the Kansas Bill of Rights. 
Second, Hodes & Nauser represents a significant assertion of judicial 
authority to limit legislative and executive actions.  This assertion of 
judicial power is neither inherently liberal nor inherently conservative, 
even if the specific results in Hodes & Nauser and Hilburn may seem to 
reflect a “liberal” ideology.  Enhanced protections for the right to keep and 
bear arms, for example, is hardly a “liberal” position as that term is 
currently understood.  Likewise, the logic of Hodes & Nauser would 
arguably support greater protections for traditionally conservative rights 
like freedom of contract, property rights, or the pursuit of a calling, which 
currently receive little or no protection under federal doctrine. 
We cannot be sure exactly what Hodes & Nauser will mean for 
constitutional doctrine in Kansas, but we can be sure that the landscape of 
constitutional rights in the state is in the midst of profound change. 
